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Abstract:  
In the context of this paper distributive justice is examined through the scope of human 
valuation in criminal and civil justice systems in the United States. Old forms of common 
law structures in Western societies were based on wergeld-like systems, which functioned as 
a redistributive framework for moving assets between parties involved in social disputes. 
Wergeld came to develop an accounting framework of legal payments proportionate to one’s 
level of wealth, which evolved to legal systems that distributed financial obligations from the 
society to the ruling class (Innes, 1932).  Mitchell Innes noticed that the role of the state in 
imposing such criminal obligations on the general society has shifted to provide a source of 
revenue to the State inevitably leading to inequality in wealth (class societies emerges). 
Recently, there have been arguments that the State has exacerbated poverty levels in urban 
communities by extensively incarcerating a significant portion of the working age population 
and imposing financial obligations on them post-release: The majority are impoverished 
blacks. In New Orleans, LA, Orleans Parish Prison (OPP) has led New Orleans to gain the 
title of being the ‘Incarceration Capital’ of the world (Vera Institute, 2007). I will argue that 
such punitive institutions— institutions constructed on the foundation of monetary 
sanctions— are not restorative or rehabilitative but instead lead to class stratification in 
which blacks are disproportionately subject to undercaste status. The United States criminal 
justice systems are retributively biased toward minority people, especially blacks, living in 
urban communities. Imposition of Legal Financial Obligations (LFOs), monetary sanctions 
mandated by the federal, state, and local statutes, overwhelmingly exacerbates cycles of 
poverty amongst the urban black cohort more so than any other race or ethnicity in the 
United States (Becket, Evans, and Harris, 2010).  The findings will be of utility for those 
seeking to understand how accumulated State debt— in the form of criminal LFOs— 
exacerbates poverty levels of indigent individuals and their families and communities. One 
will also get a deep understanding of the role State imposed monetary sanctions have played 
historically in civil and criminal justice jurisprudence. Furthermore, this paper captures the 
role of the sovereign State in stratifying classes on the basis of financial capital and race. 
 	
Key words: State, slaves, debtor prisons, monetary sanctions, wergild justice, mass 
incarceration, LFOs, punitive justice, indigency,  
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Introduction:  	 Examining the structure of the United State’s current penal system forces one to look 
back at the history of human valuation and thus the origins of money. The concept of money 
is relevant because according to the ‘unit of account’ theory advanced by Chartalist 
economists, commodity money derived from communal justice traditions. Individualized 
conflicts in ancient Egyptian civilizations conjured up a method in which human value was 
calculable based on “moveable possessions” or subsistence commodities. For this reason, 
“communal practices mediating non-identical compensation for injury or death is bound up 
with the invention of money and its uses in society” (Singh, 2016; pp. 4). Every member of 
the social order conformed to the oral justice. State-sponsored penal systems economically 
stratify classes on the basis of race in the modern context, however. How did this come to 
be? Mitchell Innes, Randall Wray, Phillip Grierson and many other State-money academics 
concedes that credit and debt relations accentuates the character of the State (authorities) in 
the creation of money. Resulting from money, which Abba Lerner branded as “a creature of 
the state”, common law structures (usually in the form of commerce taxes and religious debt 
taxes) in Graeco-Roman republics began to form a rigid two-tiered class structure when debt 
peonage divided city-states between plebeians and patricians. The involvement of temple 
administrators in Mesopotamian led to an ensuing bi-leveled civilization  (Wray and 
Semenova, 2015; Henry, 2004). However, the role of slavery in the late European 
Renaissance era added a new exploitative body to the Western State: Afro-ethnic groups. 
 Race itself is, in fact, a Western societal construction that was used to justify the 
enslavement of millions of Africans immediately following the Middle Ages. The uncivilized 
nature of Shakespeare’s novel character Caliban is a historical figure in literature. Caliban 
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epitomized the African slave narrative in early Western European literature. Robert 
McColley (1986) understood Prospero’s relation to Ariel to resemble that of a master-servant 
affiliation whereas Caliban— “the vile and wretched”— was bonded to Prospero on the 
premise of the master-slave dialectic (Ibid; pp. 13). The construction of race, since the high 
Middle Ages, has played a pivotal role in how Western societies solidified race in its 
legislative laws as means to divide not just black and white labor but also the two races 
socially. 
 People often misconstrue the role slavery, as a State institution, played in 
maintaining blacks as the underprivileged undercaste: And therefore a highly disposable 
labor source. The aphorism “last hired first fired” more times than not reference the reality of 
unemployed blacks today as it did since their ancestors were freed from the chains of slavery. 
The characteristics of the African slave codes have consistently morphed to meet the socially 
acceptable ways of governing black bodies through civil justice systems. Since President 
Abraham Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863, jails and penitentiaries 
became the lawful slave institution. The mirror images of slavery roll over into other forms 
of racially stratifying institutions: The Black Codes during Jim Crow South that forced tens 
of thousands of freedmen into the punitive convict leasing system. This ultimately spilled-
over into how industrial labor markets valued black workers and their productive capacities 
still to this day.  
Recently, there has been considerable public outcry about the state of incarceration in 
the United States. Specifically, the outcry has been geared towards the massive expansion of 
the ‘Prison Industrial Complex’ that began in the 1970s. What is more striking about the 
expansion of prisons and jails is the fact that, today, nearly 1 in 3 young black men are 
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expected to spend time in jail or prison; whereas, 1 in 17 white men are statistically expected 
to spend time in jail or prison (Huffington Post, 2016). One must then ask: What are the 
implications of these statistics? Why are the statistics relevant and what do they tell us about 
the socio-economic history of humankind in respects to monetary justice customs?  
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  Chapter I 
 
Human Valuation in Archaic Societies: State 
  Sanctioned Classism and Inequality 
 
My claim is that employing a monetary lens allows us to perceive one crucial link in 
the chain of permutations of human value in Western thought. Money—both as 
material technology and attendant conceptual category—offers a determinative 
scaffolding that is thoroughly engrained in our notions of value and worth.  
 
                                                                                           – Devin Singh, 2016; pp. 3 
 
Theories about the origins of money could and should be traced back to Mesopotamian 
(4500-1200 B.C.) societies (Innes, 1913; Graeber, 2011; Wray and Semenova, 2015; 
Seaford, 2004; Hudson, 2004). The origins of money is multifaceted and allows for 
intriguing arguments spearheaded by two primary questions: 1) What was the monetary 
function in archaic civilizations? and 2) What was the State’s role in conceptualizing money 
as a socialized commodity, which itself instigated class stratification? The two schools of 
thought that have guided the debate on the origins of money, Metalists and the Chartalists 
(Goodhart, 1998), offer concrete insight into the pre-republic lifestyles of Mesopotamian 
societies, yet they come to very distinct outcomes regarding the conceptual causality of 
money. 
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) is perhaps the first text in which the concept 
of money was addressed on the basis of private market evolution, which is the Metalist 
approach. Further developed by Carl Menger a century later—  “the view of Menger (1892) 
that the ‘market’ itself is the primary concept, and that money must logically emerge from 
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the market” (Smithin, 1994; pp. 8)— money was thought to emerge from commodity trade 
markets where the money variable would naturally lower transaction costs in individual trade 
markets. For example, in open commodity markets, otherwise known as barter systems, 
individuals traded based on the marketability of available goods, which in itself views 
commodities as a form of exchange media with varying degrees of marketability in dissimilar 
markets (Klein and Selgin, 1998; pp. 5-6; also see Menger, 1892). However, this idea is not 
represented by historical evidence. In fact, linking the origins of money to a hypothetical 
market exchange originating in barter relationships has not been recognized outside of 
Classical economic theory (Tcherneva, 2016; pp. 3: also view Ingham, 1996; pp. 516). 
Historical evidence tells a different story from the hypothetical world of barter relations, one 
that represents the true complexities of social order in human civilizations beginning with 
early Mesopotamian cultures. 
The focus in this segment of the chapter lies in theories derived from the Chartalist 
for two reasons: 1) Chartalism acknowledges that the State has played a significant role in 
devising class societies by way of imposing monetary obligations denominated in its issued 
‘unit of account,’ and 2) Debt and credit relations procured in ancient tribes via common law 
structures (which relied heavily on oral oaths) acted as the conceptual premise for money. 
Here emerges the idea of human valuation, derived from Mesopotamian oral justice 
institutions (wergeld-like systems of socialized credit and debt accounting principles), as the 
impetus for the concept of money.  
Money’s initial role as a unit of account and means of payment did not necessarily 
come from private market activity. Instead, it derived from “wergeld, bride price, religious 
occasions, etc., and its role in facilitating the fiscal basis of government, meant that 
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government made the monetary process, e.g., the guarantee through minting of the fineness 
and at the outset of the weight of the coins, into a pillar of the sovereign state” (Goodhart, 
1998; pp. 413: also see Gerloff, 1952; Laum, 1924). Almost all ancient societies studied by 
anthropologists and sociologists contribute empirical evidence that prehistoric Egyptian 
societies played a primary role in formulating the concept of money as a universal ‘unit of 
account.’ More importantly, especially for the purpose of this chapter, wergeld-like laws 
administered by distributive justice and religious obligations illustrate archaic societies that 
rely on credit and debt obligations as a basis for human valuation: This itself confirms the 
Chartalist view that money is “a system of social relations based on power relations and 
social norms” (Ingham 2000; pp. 19: See Tcherneva, 2016; pp. 3). Therefore, social relations 
of the commons, illustrated by credit and debt obligations in tribal law, in archaic societies 
were the motive force for State money.  State ‘money things’— colloquially identical to ‘unit 
of account’— later came to be regarded as the exchange media in merchant markets. 
Consequently, the State imposed debt obligations on the public were denominated in the 
State’s legal tender.  
Mesopotamia: Development of the Sovereign State Out of Tribal Society 
John Henry’s Case on Ancient Egypt 
 The road from a prehistorically egalitarian human civilization to humanity’s 
development of hierarchical class societies is grasped at its core in John Henry’s (2004) 
analysis of ancient Egyptian societies. It is universally accepted by anthropologists that prior 
to the Naqada I (4000-3500 BCE), tribal societies in Mesopotamia lived a life based on 
egalitarian subsistence. Hence, there was no true evidence of social stratification, yet. 
However, by the end of Barbarian culture (4400-4000 BCE), the “first evidence of 
inequality” was indicated by gravesite gifts, determined not only by the “amount and type of 
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grave gifts…but graves of the wealthier inhabitants are physically separated from the more 
numerous resting-places of the majority” (Henry, 2000, 2004; pp. 2: also view Hendricks and 
Vermeer, 2000). Individuals who received healthy sums of graveyard gifts were among the 
popular elite in tribes. The sighting of obsidian, an imported volcanic mineral, at gravesites 
represented a growing culture of elitism, which is interesting as elitism is often defined on an 
objectified materialistic basis. Graveyard gifts, one could argue, shows, perhaps, the earliest 
known social stratification within Mesopotamian cultures.  
 What is more important to consider, however, is the simultaneity of religious 
expansion and inequality (see Wray and Semenova, 2015; pp. 2). Henry (2004) attests that by 
Naqada III (3200-3000 BCE), also referred to as Dynasty 0, kingships naturally exhibited 
class divergence. This is the first trace of a sovereign ruler, a tribal leader that governs the 
social life of its subjects. The Palmer Stone (c. 2400) acknowledged that the Egyptian god 
Horus was the source by which kings were given divine rule over the people (Ibid; pp. 3). 
The “divine right” of the kings granted to them by Gods of Egypt, should be labeled as the 
governing force entitled to sanctified right: “The king had been chosen and approved by the 
gods…” (Malek, 2000). Universally, civilizations following Dynasty 0 broadly expanded the 
acceptance for sovereign rule evolving entirely on the premise of socialized customs and 
human valuation. The popular notion in the Old Kingdom (2625-2130 BCE) was that Sneferu 
(2625-2585 BCE) possessed “supernatural power,” and later with Dejedfre (2560-2555 BCE) 
inscription as “Son of God Re” demonstrate that “…the relationship of the corporal king to 
the principal deity of the state religion” was vulgarized in all Egyptian tribes alike (Ibid; pp. 
4). Here the primitive “religion-State pact” is revealed, which was inseparable and functioned 
as a mono-sovereign state defined by conviction. Another key point to note is that with the 
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monopoly on authority, God’s kings constructed a sense of human valuation. The Code of Ur 
(2112-2095 BCE), established under the Sumerian king Ur-Nammu, the first known written 
code of justice, was founded in fragments in Nippur and translated in 1952 by Assyriologist 
and expert in Sumerian history Samuel Kramer. In his short list of laws used to govern social 
life, one sticks out like a sore thumb— if a man committed a kidnapping, he was imprisoned 
and forced to pay fifteen shekels of silver or its equivalent in moveable possession. The 
importance of this segment, exclusively for this text, is that there exists the first form of legal 
financial obligations (LFOs) ever used in criminal and civil justice statutes. The Code of 
Hammurabi (1792-1750 BCE) came a few centuries later in Babylon adding on to the justice 
framework formulated by Ur-Nammu. Inscribed on a diorite stela— standing stone— in 
Marduk, over 280 laws were written to explain the social justice method in Hummurabi’s 
Babylon. The twenty-fourth criminal law goes as follows, “If persons are stolen, then shall 
the community and . . . pay one mina of silver to their relatives” (King, 2008). Paying 
restitution to victims of crime and to the State is expressed in both Ur-Nammu and 
Hammurabi’s codes. Human valuation, financially compensating people for their ‘lives’ 
activity’— human life, human productive activity, and physical human suffering— was 
defined in the earliest known laws of humankind. 
Egyptian kings’ form of human valuation did not strictly commence in the realm of 
commodity calculations (although the use of wergild-like justice, the first sign we have of 
social credit and debt accounting, functioned on the postulate of valuating human life). 
Instead, Egyptian Pharaohs dependency on the Nile River for crop irrigation and 
maintenance of agriculture commodities for socialized quotas (usually for tribute and tithes 
to Gods and Pharaohs) created a necessity for a skilled labor bureaucracy and an artisan labor 
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class. Skilled administrators’ (bureaucracy) knowledge, and thereby their life, was highly 
valued by the chiefdom, whereas the artisan farmers and construction workers were fairly 
dispensable because they possessed the characteristics (skills) of the common man (simple 
farm skills, handicraft knowledge, physical construction works etc.).  
Whatever skills commoners possessed were unique to their perspective tribes. Henry 
(2004) contributes that it was specialization accompanied by a “growth in the division of 
labor” that would design a bi-level society, one that separated the kinsman of the chiefdom 
from the mass commoners. For example, engineer-administrators whom engrossed 
knowledge on water channeling were generally the administrators of the economy. They 
were also members of the king’s kinship. Most were employed to spread geographically as a 
method of including distant tribes in the process of social development in Egypt (Ibid; pp. 6-
7). These Egyptian sovereign kinships were the start of the evolutionary process of sovereign 
rule that led to the welcoming of authoritarian dominance over subject masses expanding 
greatly in Classical Greece and Roman civilizations. 
  
State Institutions in ‘Primordial’ Societies 
The credit and state theories of money preform social analysis of monetary concepts: 
Money acts as a unit of account that “emphasized [a] numeraire in which credits and debts 
are measured,” a “means of payment,” “store of value” which allows one to “store wealth in 
the form of others’ debt”, and money is “a creature of the state” (Lerner, 2008: Wray, 1998: 
Keynes, 1930: view Knapp, 1924). So, Mesopotamian history offers primordial evidence that 
credit and debt social relations in pre-Graeco-Roman republics served as the foundational 
pillar on which monetary systems were built. David Graeber (2011) demonstrates that by at 
least 2700 BCE tribal chiefs were circulating twigs from hazel-wood trees to mark off credit 
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and debt obligations, whereby the creditor received the “stock” and the debtor would receive 
the “stub” (Ibid; pp. 48; see Wray, 2015; pp. 6: also see Innes, 1913). 
Considerable importance lies within the developmental scaffold of State institutions 
responsible for tax collection and their quasi-robust scheduling of individuals’ accumulated 
debts and credits. For tax collection purposes, Mesopotamian collection temples were 
perhaps the first public institution used by a governing body to assess public debt obligations 
owed to the chiefdom (Laum, 1924; Hudson, 2004; Henry, 2004). 
 
Mesopotamian temples and palaces [were] the largest economic institutions of their day 
and the prototype for modern corporations. Their internal flows of food, rations, and raw 
materials required transfer prices for account-keeping and forward planning purposes… 
Mesopotamia’s te mples and palaces were redistributive institutions. Their internal 
accounting and transfer prices were not market prices set by private barter exchange, 
although under normal conditions these public prices [later] tended to provide a model for 
prices [means of payment] in the economy at large.  
      
  – Hudson, 2004; pp. 101 
 
Henry (2004) stated:  
Writing exists: clay tags on pots identify them as belonging to a king. A system of what can 
loosely be considered taxation, related to these tags, is in place. Memphis [was] clearly an 
administrative center and tombs around the city show strong evidence of different 
bureaucratic layers with size of tombs and amount and type of grave goods corresponding 
to rank. Foreign trade is controlled by the crown. There is a class of full-time craftsmen 
catering to the king and members of the administrative bureaucracy of the state. These 
artisans not only manufacture exquisite jewelry, statuary, vessels, tools, etc. (employing a 
level of artistry and decoration that go far beyond any utilitarian requirements), but also are 
engaged in the architectural advances required by the construction of elaborate tombs and 
other public buildings, in particular the temples. Lastly, we see the development of a state 
religion, centered around the king and celebrated through a mortuary cult (Ibid; pp. 3). 
 
The very first writing, as understood by Chartalist theory, comes from wergeld-like traditions 
of marking private debts and credits records on “clay tablets or wooden tallies” in ancient 
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Mesopotamian temples and palaces (Wray, 2015, 1998; Peacock, 2003-2004; pp. 207: Henry, 
2004; pp. 3). Our way of communicating via writing has come from a tradition of socialized 
accounting for personalized criminal debts (liabilities owed because of civil disobedience). 
Criminal tariffs came to be regarded as the principle of common standards for accounting 
perceived value of objects that the offender was expected to possess or could acquire from 
his family (Wray, Henry, and Bell, 2004; pp. 58). As a result, the defendant was not the only 
person penalized for his crime, his family and their possessions were also linked to his 
punishment (which will be addressed later in the discussion of the role of accumulated debt 
in creating a servant-slave society). Nonetheless, temples and palaces were originally used to 
settle personal disputes, through “Wergeld, Cumhal, and Brehon codes,” and to bar indefinite 
vendettas from plaguing the social order. These institutions were peace mechanisms existing 
to calculate the value of life and death in order to distribute goods and services as indemnity 
payments for the sufferer and the losses his family may have endured from the conflict.  
Sumerian rulers of southern Mesopotamia pioneered universal tax obligations to 
finance caravan trade in the river valley (Graeber, 2011). That was the beginning of State-
imposed debt onto the public masses, and with it, a broader unequal distribution of wealth 
and power quickly followed. This conundrum made it crucial to establish a governing body 
that would evaluate legal debt obligations the populous owed to the “divine ruler”; God’s 
collection temples themselves reflected law and order in tribal communities. Initially 
collection temples were used to cancel private debts only. Sumerian temple-men (temple 
administrators) distributed goods from the sovereign rule to commercial merchants for 
overseas trading, the sole purpose of which was to provide necessary resources to meet 
domestic subsistence quotas (Ibid; pp. 64). For that reason, temple administrator-merchant 
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pacts present conspicuous evidence that a bureaucratic class society was firmly entrenched 
within its operations. It was largely due to this pact that class stratification further persisted 
on the premise of consolidated power. Simply put, merchants that specialized in foreign 
commodity trade were the newfound aristocrats. Their skills in navigating the river allowed 
for a steady flow of foreign resources, such as wood, stone, and silver, all which were used 
by the state to levy taxes on the public masses.  
 Gift exchange, tithe-like obligations, and tributes were social obligations inflicted on 
the public to redistribute resources to the tribal rule and his selected administrators (Innes, 
1913, 1932; Hudson, 2004; Graeber, 2011: Polanyi, 1944). Social order in Mesopotamia 
thereby references the divine right tribal kings and his administrators’, whom wielded the 
power of Gods, use of religious context to mold collective obligations in their favor. This 
early functioning of divinity rule and Gods’ justice was the nascent redistributive 
authoritarian system in which sovereign legal (lawful) obligations were defined.  
 
From Wergeld-Like Justice in Ancient Societies to Sovereignly Imposed Public 
Obligations 
 
 Debt and Credit: A Brief Etymology of Wergeld  
 A brief etymological analysis of ancient societies will shed light on the ubiquitous 
nature of wergeld-like systems. Mitchell Innes (1913), an indispensible exponent to the 
progress of the Credit and State theory of money, expressed that– “From the earliest days of 
which we have historical records, we are in the presence of law and debt”; universally, “debts 
and credits are equally familiar to all, and the breaking of the pledge word [tribal oaths of 
social justice], or the refusal to carry out an obligation is held equally disgraceful” (Ibid; pp. 
391; also see Henry, 2004). It was private conflict in archaic tribes that prompted the desire 
to incorporate a social justice network. The purpose of wergeld justice was to prevent 
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indefinite blood feuds (Innes, 1913, 1914, 1932; Wray, 1998; note Grierson, 1977, 1979; 
Goodhart, 1998). Wray (2015) corroborated that Innes defined the origins of money in terms 
of social justice (wergeld institutions), through his explanation that “the verb ‘to pay’ has the 
root meaning ‘to appease,’ ‘to pacify’ or ‘satisfy’” (Ibid; pp. 6; view Innes, 1913; pp. 392). 
This “presence of law debt,” Innes confirmed, is organic to every archaic society of which 
we have historical data. 
Michael Hudson’s The Archaeology of Money explains quite extensively the 
etymology of wergeld. He noted, “the fact that words for debt in nearly all languages are 
synonymous with ‘sin’ or ‘guilt’ reflect an origin in reparations for personal injury. German 
schuld (debt, sin) bears meaning of both offense and the obligation to make restitution” (Ibid; 
pp. 102). Modern law has its origins in credit and debt relations configured on calculated 
schedules of redistributing possessions; wergeld— which wer (Latin roots “vir”) means 
‘man’ and the German word geld (derived from the Gothic word ‘gild’) identified ‘tax’ (Ibid; 
pp. 104)— was the social opus in archaic societies. For example, in Old Icelandic tribes the 
word ‘gjald’ meant to “recompense, punishment, and payment” whereas the Old English 
term ‘gield’ equated to “substitute, indemnity, and sacrifice” (Benveniste, 1973; pp. 58). The 
etymological history of money suggests archaic societies in Greece identified money by the 
term “nomisma” (what we call numismatics in contemporary English) meaning “lawful 
distribution” (Wray, 2015). The underlining importance of wergeld justice is that human life 
became calculable. A system of human valuation, implemented by the State, was inextricably 
linked to the calendric accounting that manifested from wergeld-like justice institutions. The 
tax structure that followed wergeld’s code of law was the revolutionary aspect of common 
justice systems because the State was endowed with the natural right to impose legal 
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obligations on society. 
Primitive criminal justice frameworks instituted by wergeld as its legal body was a 
system that measured private disputes in tribal societies. In fact, according to Einzig (1966) 
‘geld’ “…implies the settling of scores or revenge” (Ibid; pp. 379). Thus the notion of 
‘worthpayment’ is inseparable from human valuation because in order to account for the 
victims’ losses, defendants had to offer his possessions (whether it is his bride or any person 
belonging to his family, commodities [could be barley crops, cattle, land, etc.] extracted from 
his property, or the defendant himself if he could not make the scheduled payment); wergeld 
comprised the standard compensation method for crimes against individuals.   
 
State Imposed Obligations Unmasked in Mesopotamia 
Primitive laws have proven to be instrumental in the establishment of money as a 
State institution. As stated earlier, wergeld-like debt accounting structures opened the door 
for a socialized unit of account to be considered by the temple-administrators and divine 
kings. With the introduction of phyle systems, a continuation of elitist tribal clans, initiated 
by the ‘divine rule’ of the king, was composed to cope with the growth and evolution of 
societies along the Nile River Valley [the king was able to prevent opposition to his 
sovereign through this new State institution] (Roth, 1991; pp. 213). Central to this new 
system (phyle) was the establishment of obligations (fines, fees, tithes, and tribute) 
imposable on the public masses so quite naturally a unit of account accompanied it. Wray 
(2015) noted that with the transformation of the authority, “wergeld fines paid to victims” 
came to encompass “fines paid to the authority, and at the same time it created the need for 
and possibility of creation of the monetary unit” (Ibid; pp. 12).  
In-kind obligations were made possible by specialization. Surplus produce in the form 
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of grains (barley and wheat mostly) was used by the State to inflict obligations on the public. 
Tcherneva (2016) notes “In Egypt, as in Mesopotamia, money emerged from the necessity of 
the ruling class to maintain accounts of agricultural crops and accumulated surpluses, but it 
also served as a means of accounting for payment of levies, foreign tribute, and tribal 
obligations to the kings and priests” (Ibid; pp. 5). Such a redistributive mechanism created a 
broad extraction of moveable possessions from the commoners so that “surplus [would] flow 
from the producing classes to the non-producing minority, privileging the latter at the 
expense of the former” (Wray, Bell, and Wray 2004; pp. 58). Most times these obligations 
went to the king in the form of tribute payments, other times “criminal law” served as the 
purpose of redistributing resources to the king.  
The newly derived tax system functioned with a level of sophistication that embodies 
taxation methodologies in contemporary sovereign states. For example, tax assessors came to 
regard twigs as a way in which the chief (or any other form of sovereign authority) could 
impose debt obligations onto the public while also providing the liquidity necessary to meet 
State imposed debt. Sin-taxes, manslaughter and murder crimes, and sovereign quotas were 
social debt obligations no person in the tribe was excluded from. Such systems found their 
place in almost every archaic system examined thus far. Resulting from such systems, tribal 
“criminal justice” networks came to embody the force by which money became a necessity to 
account for generalized debt obligations. Wergeld-like institutions are the pinnacle agencies 
by which the divine chiefs of Mesopotamia could rationalize imposing debt obligations onto 
the public via universal unit of accounts. However, early taxation standards varied greatly 
from grain units of accounts to electrum coins, mina, the shekel, and then the pound. The 
“shekel-weight of silver (240 barley grains)” (Hudson, 2004; pp. 112) was disbursed 
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throughout Sumerian tribes in which the authorities (not the open market, as suggested by 
barter theories) assigned utility to metallic currency by linking it to surplus commodities; this 
was the birth of the liquidity process. In fact, the earliest known unit of account was the 
deben (though there was not a universal commodity or “money thing” that reflected it, it was 
“virtual” money) an “abstract measure for standardizing weights and prices, much like in the 
Mesopotamian palaces…wheat, copper, labor etc. [encompassed debens as means of 
payment]” (Tcherneva, 2016: pp. 5; also emphasized in Wray, 1990: Henry, 2004; pp. 11). 
Such systems of redistribution led to State based stratification that rolled-over into the 
democratic societies of Greece and Rome. 
    Civilization in the Graeco-Roman World: The 
     Military-Coinage-Slave Complex 
 
With imperial expansion of Greco-Roman cultures emerges a clear path to 
understanding the complexities of what Geoffrey Ingham (2004) termed the ‘military-
coinage complex.’ However, in accordance with David Graeber, a third element was missing 
from Ingham’s analysis of the unbounded-ness of military expansion and the derivative 
metallic currency that followed it: the institution of maritime servitude (pre-modern slavery) 
(Graeber, 2011; pp. 229). The reason slavery is referred to as an institution here is congruent 
to Thomas Wiedemann’s (1981) idea that, “Slavery is an institution of the common law of 
peoples (ius gentium) by which a person is put into ownership (dominium) of somebody else, 
contrary to natural order” (Ibid; pp. 15). Sandra Joshel (2010) explains: “‘Institution” means 
an organization of roles that include conduct— how people should behave or how they are 
imagined to behave. It refers, too, to a system of practices and ideas that are socially 
sanctioned and maintain the continued existence of the institution” (Ibid; pp. 10-11). 
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Collective institutions governed by bureaucratic structures speak to the development process 
shown by Graeco-Roman polis and civitas as civilized States. Inherent to ancient city-states 
are disenfranchised public masses. Whether it is religious temples or public market places, 
commoners were bound by public institutions and thereby obligated to their customs. 
 Slavery was a system that became naturalized with imperial expansions across the 
Mediterranean seacoast. In the Graeco-Roman civilizations of the Axial Age (800 BCE— 
600 A.D.), new civilizations had come to replace those of the ancient Mesopotamian order. 
Slavery became an important identity marker for the “new societies,” civilizations that were 
defined by the ideas of written codes and civil law and order. The Greek city-states (polis) 
were not unlike the Roman’s civitas, “founded upon by territory and property” (Morgan, 
1877), in that both represented a broad establishment of democratic principles that reflected 
an evolved class society from primordial Egyptian and other Mesopotamian civilizations. 
Many pay homage to Servius Tullius (576-533 BCE) for he altered the political conservatism 
established under Romulus’ gentile government (societas) by incorporating Athenian 
democracy as its centerpiece. 
 
A Brief Analysis of Graeco-Roman Democratic Ideologies 
  Democracy, according to Michael Saward (1991), is explained in a multitude of 
ways. In addition to its most common understanding of  “rule by the people,” democratic 
city-states could also be labeled as an “essentially contestable” political society in which 
laws are discussed and debated by “the people” for public interest (Ibid; pp. 8-9). Dean 
Hammer’s (2005) account of the “Plebiscitary Politics in Ancient Greece” emphasizes that 
Grecian Democracy came by way of a bottom-up progression in that “demos defined itself in 
opposition to tyrants” (Ibid, pp. 107). Hammer provides a perplexing vindication that hostile 
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relationships existed between tyrants— divine sovereigns and their lineage (bloodline) that 
inherited the divine titles to rule over commoners— and the subject citizenry (demos). As a 
result, “plebiscitary politics provided a public space, often volatile, in which a vocabulary of 
democracy could develop” (Ibid; pp. 109). The Struggle of Orders in the early Roman 
Republic (509-264 BCE) was the mechanism by which law and order dialectics manifested. 
The struggle for social order was an instrumental discourse that formulated Roman style 
democracy. In fact, Morgan (1877) states that the Licinian legislations in 376 BCE uplifted 
the plebian class to citizen status in Roman civitas. 
Prior to Roman democracy, Solon was titled champion of democratic politics and 
law. His political reform efforts in sixth century BCE Athens led to distribution of political 
power on a grand scale. Astonishingly enough, he gained broad support from the Athenians 
by increasing the number of citizens when releasing wartime slaves from their masters and 
giving them legal protections as citizens, while incorporating a council of about 400 elected 
officials (Ibid, pp. 122; look into Morgan, 1877: pp. 262; Peacock, 2016).  
Plato’s philosophy of law was expressed by Humphreys (1988) as “proposing to use 
law as a tool for shaping the good society in the Laws, is restating the claim of the elite to 
speak with special authority in matters of law, he is stating it in a way that is typical of 
democratic societies …Plato’s conception of law is repressive” (Ibid; 477). In such a society, 
Plato seems to evoke the idea that elitist philosophers should and would dominate the civil 
order through moral and religious knowledge. Plato’s Laws were too radical to be adopted in 
the democratic polis and civitas of the Graeco Roman world, though.  
The Greek polis, for example, was comprised of phratry (consisting of about ten 
distinct genes) in which each gene involved elected a priest (curio) as “chief of fraternity 
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enacting sacred rites” to represent their interest in the polis (Morgan, 1877; pp. 303-306; see 
Humphreys, 1988; pp.  466). Furthermore, in 711 BCE the archon (one official ruler) 
surpassed the curio as the elected officialdom for all genes serving ten-year terms initially— 
democratic reform occurred again in 638 BCE increasing the archon cohort to nine officials: 
Their terms were constricted to annual election cycles (Ibid; pp.  261). A broad establishment 
of democratic institutions was emerging in Greece that reflected its evolution to a civil State. 
The assembly of the people expressed by the term agora, the census process of citizens’ 
registering their property in townships (demes), and individual polities acting as the 
governing body of these townships, speaks to the broad distribution of power enacted by the 
new society. This is a microscopic look into the development of democracy in Greek polis. 
However, it is necessary for this text because of the rationalization of “civil laws” and 
“natural laws” of slavery that manifested within the philosophical framework of Greek city-
states.  
 
Money in the Graeco-Roman World 
Among the earlier public institutions established were minting institutions. Goodhart 
(1998) explained that minting coins was always a function of the State, which allowed for 
coins to be ‘tokenized’ rather than being valued based on the metal content. A key point 
Goodhart makes, which departs from State monopoly on minting, is the notion that wartime 
efforts made State’s money less credible because “currencies became of lower quality, more 
likely to be debased, and less acceptable in commerce” (Ibid; pp. 415). In this case, Orthodox 
theories on money’s intrinsic worth-value gains clout because the debasement of coinage 
during war could be the reason money’s intrinsic value, relating to its metallic content, are 
meaningful. On the other hand, Heterodox economists classified by Chartalist theories, could 
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attest that States’ credibility as sovereign is attacked when at war and thus causes a low 
demand for its ‘money things.’ Broken down more intuitively, warring States’ metallic 
currencies are as credible as the State itself. In this sense, a State’s military dominance and its 
annexation over an opposing territory reflect its currency’s worth being more credible to that 
of the conquered nation’s. Due to the known fact that imperial expansion provides us with a 
clear winner and loser after wars, one State generally preserves its right as a sovereign nation 
while the other becomes the annexed, colonized, or conquered. However, when wars are in 
progress and there is no prominent military force, international demand and domestic 
demand for warring States’ money logically diminishes until a winner is revealed.  
A. Mitchell Innes (1913) gives a metallurgical account of ancient currencies in times 
of peace to show that there was no true intrinsic value of metallic currencies. In relation to 
Lydia’s electrum coin he states, “While some contains more than 60 per cent of gold, others 
known to be of the same origin contain more than 60 per cent of silver, and between these 
extremes, there is every degree of alloy, so that they could not possibly have a fixed intrinsic 
value” (Ibid). Therefore all money in Greece was tokenized. Roman As and other forms of 
currency it devised were no different; they, too, were tokenized. What differentiated Roman 
As, metallic currency based on the Oscan pound, from the Greek electrum coinage was the 
stamp-of-value unique to fractional As, whereby they were “divided into twelve ounces” and 
represented a “pound-weight of copper”. Innes took heed to the metallurgical accounting of 
Mommsen who confirmed that Roman As were alloyed with lead, making it highly unlikely 
that the coins truly weighed a pound of copper. Innes assessed that: 
 
The Asses which ought to weigh a pound [of copper], vary in fact from 208 
grammes to 312 grammes with every shade of weight between these two extremes. 
The Half-Asses, which ought to weigh 136.5 grammes weigh from 94 grammes to 
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173 grammes; the Third-of-an-As, which ought to weigh 91grammes, weigh from 
66 grammes to 113 grammes, and the Sixth-of-an- As, weigh from 32 grammes to 
62 grammes, and so on for the rest (Ibid). 
  
Repressive forms of law were established in what will be referred to here as “ancient slave 
codes”. The large-scale shift to socialized institutions in Greece and Rome has its roots in 
monetary institutions that relied on metallic commodities mined by the hands of slaves. A 
genealogy of metallic currency in Greece and Rome proves to be of great utility in 
accordance to slavery and State fiscal expansion (Goodhart, 1998; pp. 412: Seaford, 2004). 
Imperial expansion of the early Graeco-Roman civilizations was due largely to a broad 
demand for metallic currency (Graeber, 2011; Ingham, 2004; Morris, 1986; Bradley, 1987: 
pp. 15; see Seaford, 1998; pp. 199-121). Although gold, silver, and bronze became the 
money of the State, it was not necessarily desired for its intrinsic value, but for its title as 
means of payment for any imposed duty by the State. Money is an institution (see Keynes’ 
institutional approach to State money for further elaboration) made necessary for the purpose 
of paying State debt and the need to find an omnipresent unit of account to calculate the 
worth of all bartered commodities. With the State monopolizing the minting process of coins, 
it had the power to tokenize a ‘money thing’ (a commodity) by relating its value to that of 
livestock, grains, and human life; as noted by Desmond (1962), female slaves whom were 
skilled in handicrafts could be sold for four ox-units (see Semenova, 2011; pp. 109).  
 
From Ox-Units of Account to Metallic Currency 
 There is no source that provides a clearer pathway to the historical development of 
State commodity money (metallic currency mostly— but in Carthage’s Phoenician colony 
promissory notes were issued as the State’s ‘money thing’) than that of Alla Semenova’s 
(2011) “Would you Barter with God?”. Semenova begins by examining, perhaps, “the first 
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unit of value and account” in ancient Greece societies: Ox-units of account. Semenova states, 
“…by specifying the precise quality, type and quantity of oxen to be sacrificed, ancient 
Greek religion provided the first instance of a unit value established and guaranteed by the 
“state” in which the ox-unit (ox-units of account and value are expressed in terms of ‘limbs’ 
worth’ to divine rulers) was used to value “objects in terms of other objects” (Ibid; pp. 376-
377). Ox-units were discussed in Homeric epics in ninth and eighth century BCE as a source 
of sacrificial tribute to Gods, communal offerings, and feasts. Wergeld-like accounting is 
found in such institutions because “the ox-unit of value became a unit of account in which 
various fines and payments were denominated in the earliest laws of the Graeco-Roman 
world” (Ibid; pp. 378). Unlike wergeld institutions of lawful distribution that depended on 
“moveable possession” including indebted people and their family, Ingham (1996) notes 
“killing a king…involved selling into slavery of the murderer’s whole extended family”). 
Ox-units became the universal unit of account accepted as obligatory payments for tributes to 
the state (Ibid; pp. 520).  
 There was a social hierarchy with the establishment of ox-unit of account in that 
temple-men (priesthood) were in charge of imposing sacrificial repast as a way to pay tribute 
to the gods, devout ‘divine ruler,’ and his administration. Sacrificial offerings were very 
much like wergeld accounting in that the rich, the poor and even slaves were by law “civil 
servants” bounded by the State to participate in the communal (koinoia) offerings through the 
dictum of “equal share”; “The public meal…[coated] the social reality of antagonistic 
relationships between masters and slaves” (Ibid; pp. 387). Also, citizens were obligated to 
pay the State these offerings from the surplus possessions (of bulls): Semenova (2011) 
explains, “not just quantity but quality parts were distributed to the higher ranks”— five 
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pieces of the bull went to presidents and archons, one piece went to the treasurers of the gods 
and feast managers, and the “customary portions to the others (plebian class)” (Ibid; pp. 387-
388: Wray and Semenova, 2015; pp. 9: view Peacock, 2011, 2013). In the Book of Leviticus, 
Moses’s Israelites sin-offerings could be paid only through sacrificing bulls (ox-units):  
 
If the priest sins, bringing guilt on the people, he must bring to the lord a 
young bull without defect as a sin offering for the sin he has committed…If the whole 
Israelite community sins unintentionally…they are guilty…the assembly must bring a 
young bull as a sin offering and present it before the Tent of Meeting. The elders of 
the community are to lay their hands on the bull’s head before the Lord, and the bull 
shall be slaughtered before the Lord.  
  
      –  [Leviticus: 4: 2-15] 
 
From communal offerings, sacrificial meals and tribute obligations, commodity 
money rose from the ashes to provide the State with a tangible commodity (metallic 
currency) to set up a universal system of accounting for debt obligations it imposed first 
denominated in moveable assets. The etymology of Greek coinage is quite striking because it 
references the tradition of animate sacrificial offerings. ‘Pecuniary’ has its roots in the Latin 
word ‘pecus’ (noting cattle), ‘fee’ has its origins in Gothic word ‘fahi’ translated to mean 
cattle as well, and ‘capital’ is thought to come from the word ‘capitale’ [a term noting head 
count of cattle] (Semenova, 2011; pp. 378). An interesting aspect of the genealogy of 
metallic currency is the fact that the first commodity used as money came from the iron spits 
(obelos) that were used to cook bulls’ meat at sacrificial ceremonies: Conveyed in 
Etymologicum Magnum obolos (sixth century B.C. silver coinage) was used broadly as 
Greece “money” in which the drachma (“a handful of six spits”) quickly followed (Ibid; pp. 
390; Wray and Semenova, 2015:  also see Seaford, 2004; and Laum, 1924). From these 
derivative “money things” came the rationalization of universal State money that originated 
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in Lydia with the electrum coin (Ibid; pp. 377; Bell, Henry, and Wray, 2004: pp. 61; 
Goodhart, 1998: pp. 415; Innes, 1913; Graeber, 2011: pp. 224). It is with the Lydian electrum 
coinage that the nature of the military-coin-slave complex will be assessed here in depth 
because electrum coinage, thought to be in circulation between seventh and sixth century 
BCE, was the source of State commodity money introduced by Pheidon of Argos. 
 
 
Money and State Slave Labor 
 
Lydian coins were invented explicitly to pay mercenaries. This might help explain 
why the Greeks, who supplied most of the mercenaries, so quickly became 
accustomed to the use of coins, and why the use of coinage spread so quickly across 
the Hellenic world, so that by 480 BC there were at least one hundred mints 
operating in different Greek cities (Graeber, 2011; pp. 227). 
 
An international market for metallic currency (gold, silver, and bronze) was made 
necessary with imperial expansion of the Graeco-Roman cultures across Mediterranean 
coasts. Greek authorities were the dominant force for commodifying metallic minerals in the 
archaic city-states (polis) due to the fact that it allowed them to expand their superior ‘civil 
order’ across borders. The civilized people of the polis were not considered as disposable 
bodies for war by the State. Hiring mercenaries from abroad (Athens, Sparta, and even the 
Persians prior to 547 BCE) to fight in war created a demand for a labor source to mine 
minerals in order to pay off lump sums of debts owed to mercenaries. In fact, Seaford (1998) 
noted that early Homeric epics did not have money, yet Homeric tragedies did contain 
metallic money because “like other institutions of the polis, coinage influences the tragic 
representation of heroic myth” (Seaford, 1998; pp. 199). Money was a debt-based instrument 
that became a symbol of tragedy because of the social plight it caused, the naturalization of 
class stratification, and hostility it projects towards the ‘have-nots.’   
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  The reason such money things (metallic minerals) became popularized, one could 
attest, is because of credibility of a sovereign State attached to its ‘legal tender’ (for further 
elaboration see Wray and Semenova, 2015; pp. 5). Gold, silver, and bronze (and later copper) 
metals were broadly accepted not for their intrinsic (utility) value but rather for the sovereign 
State’s willingness to accept its minted ‘money thing’ as means of payment for taxes, 
criminal justice fines and fees, and also goods and services provided by the sovereign 
authorities. Seaford (1998) argues that money did not originally function as a means of 
payment, store of value, or a universal unit of account (measure of value)— the only quasi 
function of metallic money prior to its full-fledged circulation in fifth and sixth century BCE 
was the unit of account [means of valuing ox-units] (Ibid; pp.199). In a society where one is 
coerced by the State to meet sovereignly imposed obligations (taxes, tithes, tributes, criminal 
fines and fees, etc.), it is quite natural that the State’s ‘money thing’ becomes a source of 
liquidity on domestic trades markets. Thereby emerges a Chartalist theory of State money 
rerouting to private activities of commodity trade, labor compensations, and paying off debts 
to not just the State but private individuals that one may have entered into a credit-debt 
relation with. States’ unit of account becomes the universal unit of account for all and its 
value lies in the fact that it is accepted internationally and domestically as a means of 
payment for all commodities including labor and debt. As expressed by Wray and Semenova 
(2015): 
In the chartalist approach, the “state” (or any other public authority able to impose 
an obligation) imposes a liability in the form of a generalized, social or legal unit of 
account—a money—used for measuring (or denominating) the obligation. Money is 
introduced by the state as a unit of account in which debts and other obligations to 
the state are denominated and have to be repaid. It is from this power to extinguish 
debts and other obligations to the state that money acquires its value (Ibid; pp. 4). 
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Innes (1913) defines money by the notion “law of debt” in that the true value of 
money lies in the fact that it is accepted as debt payments by the State who imposes legal 
financial obligations publicly; no one is excluded from such payments as shown by the 
priesthood offering of a bull (as its sin offering) in the Book of Leviticus. How was the State 
able to extract insurmountable quantities of metallic minerals to meet the growing demand of 
metallic currency in the Graeco-Roman civilizations? Who benefitted most from the newly 
devised monetary institutions of the State? How did money circulate throughout the domestic 
economy? These questions are the motivational sources for seeking and elaborating on the 
nature of the military-coin-slave complex instigated by State money. As noted, Greek and 
Roman imperial expansion in sixth century BCE has led to slavery being labeled as a civil 
institution, one that has been embedded in the cultures of early democratic states by way of 
law (the next chapter will explore the lawful origins of slavery and its institutional design). It 
is understood from a sociological standpoint that precious metals became the universal 
equivalent by which all forms of debt, at the private and State level, could be cancelled out.  
	28		
Aristotle’s Politics was the original pamphlet for slavery illustrating the lawful 
indebtedness of domestic slaves and “prisoners of war” to their masters. The very lives of 
slaves and their inscription as property (animate) of their master signals indefinite 
indebtedness through coerced services to their masters; the Aristotelian notion of “property 
with a soul” indicates the naturalizing process of slavery in Athens. State slaves’ services as 
miners were the prime stimulus for expanding the slave population via war, and would allow 
for a natural growth in the domestic slave population by aid of artificial selection (on slave 
breeding in Rome see Bradley, 1987; 15). M.I. Finley (1980) provides a startling account of 
Roman conquest as the means by which land and slaves were conquered: 
 
Its essential role (Roman conquest), however, was in creating the basis for large 
estates, with all the consequences that followed for Roman society and therefore for 
the “structure” of Roman slavery. The “conquest theory” thus helps to explain the 
specific character of the Roman slave society, not its emergence (Ibid; pp. 84-85). 
 
He also provides a scale of Roman slavery: 
 
“On conservative estimates— 60,000 slaves in Athens at the end of the fifth century 
B.C., 2,000,000 in Italy at the end of the Republic— the comparable percentages 
are in precisely the same range, about 30 and 35%, respectively” (Ibid; pp. 80). 
 
“In 296 [BCE], during the third Samnite war…Livy records the enslavement of 
40,000 captives, a figure which may not be accurate but is also not complete. In 262 
[BCE] came the first of a long series of mass enslavement during the Punic wars, 
25,000 after the capture of Agrigento” (Ibid; pp. 83) 
 
Sandra Joshel’s (2010) Slavery in the Roman World gives us an account of the slave 
population in the Roman Empire by looking at the “First and Second Slave Wars (c. 135-132 
and c. 104-101 BCE)” that occurred in Sicily. The First Slave War (135-132 BCE) was an 
uprising in Enna, Sicily against a “brutal” slave master named Damophilos (delineating by 
the ancient historian Diodorus Siculus) in slave prisoners— “a force of 400 slaves”— 
ravaged Enna until the Romans suppressed the rebellion. “Roman estimates of the total 
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number of slaves involved in the rebellion range from 60,000 to 200,000…Romans finally 
quelled the rebellion in 132 BCE by recovering Taormina and Enna, two key centers of 
resistance” (Ibid; pp. 59). The Second Slave War (104-101 BCE) was outlined by Diodorus 
Siculus. The German tribe Cimbri was the source of the uprising in which “…the number of 
slaves in revolt grew from about 1,000 to 10,000” (Ibid; pp. 62). It is important to put slave 
population growth into perspective because it extends the dialogue to consider the 
importance of slave demand in early societies while also allowing imperial conquest to be 
labeled as a means of not just expanding State borders (land) but the slave population as well. 
One could advocate that Graeco-Roman expansion was morally expressed in the discourse 
‘us’ versus ‘the rest,’ or ‘civil’ versus ‘barbarian,’ in that imperial expansion was just in 
accordance to didactic expansion (something which will be explored more in-depth when 
discussing Western philosophical justification for African enslavement).  
 Imperial expansion was justified by the ‘civil’ versus ‘barbarian’ discourse, which 
allowed the civilized Graeco-Roman states to domesticate barbarians abroad by showing 
them the civil way-of-life through enslavement. The most egregious aspect of imperializing 
barbaric lands is the idea that people inhabiting these lands were property of the civilized 
whom possessed no citizen rights. The Roman state compelled conquered peoples, its prime 
labor force, to mine for metallic content used for currency. After wars of imperial expansion 
in Italy and their annexation of Mediterranean states, the war captives were brought to 
perform a variety of services. This is why Finley notes that slaves did not form a rigid class 
in Rome— but “the most miserable being those of workers in mines” (Ibid; pp. 15). 
Graeber’s (2011) notion of the “military-coinage-slave complex” is instrumental because it 
constructs an advanced analysis of the inseparable nature of military expansion and State 
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money (metallic money) along with State dependence on slave labor to supply its money 
things. Graeber notes, “…it was slavery, though, that made all this possible. As the figures 
concerning Sidon, Tyre, and Carthage suggest, enormous numbers of people were being 
enslaved in many of these conflicts, and of course many slaves ended up working in the 
mines, producing even more gold, silver, and copper” (Ibid; pp. 229). According to “Mining 
Greece: The Lavrion Project,” the most telling city that provides scale to the importance of 
slave miners is the Athenian city known as Laurium (located in eastern Attica). Athens had 
nearly 20,000 slaves mining silver and iron ore at Laurium at the request of Themistocles, in 
which the silver was used to invest in a navy force (proven pivotal in Greece’s defeat of 
Xerxes’ Persian invasion around 480 BCE).  
 
                                                                Conclusion: 
  Chartalist debt-based theory respective of monetary origins provides an intriguing 
model that is necessary to grasp the historical and sociological importance of State-imposed 
debt as the premise for a class society. As expressed in wergeld-like traditions of 
redistributive justice, unit of accounts prior to metallic currency’s reign (tally sticks, cowry 
shells, hazel wood etc.) was a process to calculate debt obligations in a robust system of 
accounting. However, debt payments at the time were based on “moveable possessions” from 
the defendant to the victim of transgression. Individual lives were calculated on clay tablets 
in temples, thus, it can be argued that wergeld was a system of human valuation because 
many transgressions led to the enslavement of poor defendants and their family members 
until the ‘moveable possessions’— whether it be 100 bushels of barley or animate 
possessions for subsistence— were delivered to the victim. Allowing human life (chattel-
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humans) to be collateral ultimately ‘commodified’ people by objectifying defendants’ lives, 
as one’s life was compatible to moveable possessions. 
The debt-based theory of money, especially that of metallic currency, proposes rather 
intriguing evidence in that State commodity money was originally issued as a debt token to 
mercenaries fighting on behalf of Greece. The ‘civil’ versus ‘barbarian’ discourse made way 
for the rationalization of conquering ‘uncivilized States as the natural order of the world. The 
need to spread dominance across borders in Graeco-Roman societies contributed to the mass 
enslavement of conquered people. Resulting from this, slavery became institutionalized as a 
civil convention forming an intimate connection with military dominance and minting 
practices. The value of slaves was embedded in their services (productive laborers) to the 
State as miners. They were dispensable souls offering their lives to mine metallic currency 
for the State. One could also insert that their lives as miners was the mechanism by which 
imperial States gained international clout because they provided necessary labor to pay off 
mercenaries used in war and naval fleets built to force imperial rule across Mediterranean 
borders. Whatever approach one takes is plausible. However, no one could deny the 
importance of military-coinage-slave complex in conceptualizing a civil society in Greek 
polis and in Roman civitas. The institution of slavery as a civil component of the ancient 
Graeco-Roman world must be explored to compose a linear progression from old institutions 
of slavery to the contextualization of chattel humans in the New World.  	
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    Chapter 2 
 
  From the Legal System of Slavery in 
Ancient Rome and Greece to Racialized  
      Slavery in the Western World 
 
Freeman and slave, patrician and plebian, lord and serf, guild-master and 
journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to 
one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that 
each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in 
the common ruin of the contending classes. 
          — Marx, 1848; pp. 204 
        
Georg W.F. Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Mind: Self Consciousness should not be 
forgotten, for the impact it had on moral philosophy (which later became regarded as 
economics) still lives on through Marx’s examination of the political economy. More 
importantly, the segment titled “Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: 
Lordship and Bondage” has provided substantial service to understanding the reciprocal 
nature of master-slave and lord-bondsman dialectics. Based on the subjective-objective 
nature of human consciousness, Hegel paints a clear portrait of power dynamics inherent to 
master-slave or lord-bondsman relations:  
 
The master is the consciousness that exists for itself; but no longer merely the 
general notion of existence for self. Rather, it is a consciousness existing on its own 
account which is mediated with itself through an other consciousness, i.e. through 
an other whose very nature implies that it is bound up with an independent being or 
with thinghood in general. The master brings himself into relation to both these 
moments, to a thing as such, the object of desire, and to the consciousness whose 
essential character is thinghood (Ibid; 1807). 
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Hegel’s reasoning of consciousness and self-consciousness is built on experience and 
recognition. The master’s subjectivity is gained by having a slave recognize his position as 
superior and thus, there is an automatic labeling of the slave as not possessing subjectivity, 
he is merely an object (commodity) of the master (this relation is clarified in Marx’s (1844) 
First Manuscript: ‘Alienated Labor’). By objectifying the slave, there is “duplicity” in which 
the master and slave gain “the pure conception of recognition” by comprehending and 
accepting the power dynamics inherent to their pact. The slave’s essential character is 
determined by his status as property of the master. This has historically been the case with all 
forms bondage relations in civilizations that pre-date Hegel’s time, as well as bondage 
relations that followed his work (i.e., Marx’s modern interpretation of the bourgeoisie-worker 
dialectic).  
 Historians, sociologists, and anthropologists who study the evolution of slavery have 
not, at least overtly, delve deeply into the subjective-objective dialogue established by Hegel. 
It is precisely this dialogue of conscious recognition between master (subject) and slave 
(object) that established lawful “code-of-conducts” used to identify individuals in servitude 
and those whom were free in the early slave societies of the ancient Graeco-Roman world. 
The discourse of slavery in ancient Greek and Rome societies was one that determined, and 
then solidified, the identity of slaves through the lens of their masters: i.e., a slave’s selfhood 
was understood through his masters’ interpretation of the slaves’ objectiveness as property, 
commodity, product etc. It then becomes important to consider the questions: How did 
customary law determine slaves’ identity in Graeco-Roman city-states?; Who controlled 
slaves and what labor did they perform?; and lastly, what were the effects of subjugating 
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barbarians to servitude and how did the ‘civil’ versus ‘barbarian’ discourse influence 
Aristotle’s laws of the ‘natural slave?’   
 
       Slavery in the Graeco-Roman Epoch 
 
Customary Slave Laws in Ancient Societies: Slave Identity as Property 
M.I. Finley (1980) is broadly acknowledged as an important proponent of the master-
slave discourse in archaic slave societies. Finley notes the existence of “…three components 
of slavery— the slave’s property status, the totality of the power over him, and his 
kinlessness…” (Ibid, 1980; pp. 77). The nature of slaves in Graeco-Roman societies 
expressed by Thomas Wiedemann (1981) is based on three key ideas as well: (1) “A human 
being who by nature does not belong to himself but to another person— such a one is by 
nature a slave; (2) A human being belongs to another when he is a piece of property as well 
as being human; (3) A piece of property is a tool which is used to assist some activity, and 
which has a separate existence of its own” (Ibid; pp. 18, 23). Kostas Vlassopoulos (2011) 
advocates for Wiedemann’s concepts of the nature of slaves in ancient Greece and Rome 
almost verbatim when stating:  
 
…the nature of the slave and his essential quality; [a slave is] one who is a human 
being (anthropos) belonging by nature not to himself but to another as by nature a 
slave, and a human being belongs to another if, although a human being, he is a 
piece of property (ktema), and a piece of property is an instrument for action 
separate from its owner.  
 
     – Vlassopoulos, 2011; pp. 115  
 
During Graeco-Roman republicanism there were no words that overtly connoted 
slaves. Linguistically, all words that determined servile status was somewhat linked to the 
notion of private property or ownership. Chattel humans being titled “animate property” was 
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legalized in Caius’ Institutes in which an “…owner’s absolute right of property over his slave 
led to the inability of slaves to be entitled property rights, thus his property belonged to the 
household of his master” The idea of belonging to someone else essentially classifies all 
“slaves (doulos) as ‘a living piece of property’” (Wiedemann, 1981; pp. 30). Vlassopoulos 
denotes that the Greeks used a variety of terms to identify slaves, in which “…enslaved 
individual[s] could be called doulos, andrapodon, pais, hyperetes, soma, oiketes, etc. each 
time with a different emphasis in mind” (Ibid; pp. 117). However, it was the term doulos— 
connoting chattel humans as property of their masters— that was used as the popular term for 
slaves in Greece (Ibid: also see Finley, 1980; pp. 69). The Roman term dominus or 
‘dominion’ was used to denote individual ownership by which some Roman text, Cicero for 
an example, illustrated the “slave-mastery” relation (Nyquest, 2008; pp. 359). In opposition 
to the enslaved population (douleia), free men (eleutheros) had to solidify their subjectivity 
through designing a separate system of customary laws for themselves. Broken down, 
eleutheros (free men) were by nature civil beings thereby possessing the free will to 
determine their path in life. In ancient Graeco-Roman societies, as noted in chapter one, the 
enslaved population overwhelmingly belonged to wartime captives (who Romans called 
ergastulum).   
Since the beginning of chattel human customs (which began with the debt based 
theory of wergeld) in Mesopotamia, servants have been seen as individuals who were 
indebted to their masters based on collective justice systems. It is important to establish some 
boundaries here about what is meant by the term slave. In the most general sense of Graeco-
Roman servile laws, chattel wartime captives were humanized commodities or capital 
instruments for masters. But couldn’t debt-bondsman and Sparta’s helots also be considered 
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human property? The answer to this is yes; a person belonging to any of these servile classes 
could, in the broadest sense of the term, be labeled another’s property. Does this make them a 
slave though? The short answer is no. The reason so is that a slave was often recognized as 
an alien, a foreigner, an outsider etc. This is the reason that slave populations inclined 
dramatically in Rome after the Samnite Wars (343-290 BCE).  
 
Mass enslavement in Rome’s foreign wars made possible the growth of a 
large-scale slave system. First, war increased the slave population in Italy and 
continually fed that population with new captives. Rome’s early wars in Italy had 
resulted in the enslavement of some of the conquered, but the enslavement of large 
numbers of the conquered apparently began with Rome’s wars with the Samnites, a 
people in south central Italy…The Roman conquest of the Mediterranean in the 
second century BCE escalated the number of slaves…[For example] in 177 BCE 
during his campaign in Sardinia, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus killed or enslaved 
80,000 of the island inhabitants. 
        — Joshel, 2010; pp. 54-55 
 
Another key factor that separates slaves from helots, debt-bondsmen, and serfs is the 
idea that their freedom depended on the masters’ will to free them. In regards to the 
Messenian helots (thought to be conquered around 8th century BCE with the Messenian 
Wars), they were essentially “collective bondsmen” working to provide subsistence goods to 
the greater Spartan citizenry. The early Greek lyric poet, Tyrtaeus, explains that Messenian 
helots paid tribute to the Spartan authority through their labor as farmers; they provided 
subsistence goods to the Roman citizenry and in return were allowed to keep the surplus 
produce for themselves (Apud Pausanias 4-5; it is also discussed in Plutarch’s Life of 
Lycurgus). Helots had rights that were not entitled to wartime captives, such as the right to 
procreate and the right to purchase freedom. Plutarch’s Life of Cleomeles noted that over 
5,000 helots purchased their freedom in third century BCE for about 500 drachmas per 
person (Ibid; pp. 23). Their indebtedness was paid off and their possession as free people 
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restored. As for the debt-bondsmen, they were bonded to masters on contractual credit-debt 
arrangements agreed upon prior to their servitude. Debt-bondsmen original status as freeborn 
citizens barricaded them from being a ‘natural slave.’ They were indebted to their master 
because of personal choice, not by legal and natural laws (a topic explored in chapter three).  
The institutional nature of slavery was based on conquest and imperial expansion 
juxtaposed to it being a social institution derived within Graeco-Roman city-states. Barbaric 
captives were defined as ‘others’— they were nonnative to the civil order and social customs 
of Greece and Roman city-states.  In fact, slaves were called servi in Roman societies 
because commanders sold people they captured. Commanders habitually servare (saved) 
wartime captives as opposed to slaughtering them because of their productive capacities. The 
sale of a slave as property (mancipia) encapsulates his legal status as a debtor to his master. 
This indebtedness was expressed through slaves’ servile labor, which masters utilized to 
produce surplus commodities for markets: the motive for slave labor was to maximize his 
masters’ profits— to produce a surplus in commodities that would allow his master to obtain 
metallic currency to meet State imposed obligations (tithes, taxes, criminal fines and fees, 
tribute etc.) and to give more leisure to his master by producing his subsistence. The tradition 
of wergeld debt-peonage in ancient Egypt was the institutional paragon of a servile society 
since wergeld is the first custom that subjugated debtors to the whims of creditors. In stating 
that wergeld systems were the conceptual premise for a servile society, it is meant that power 
dynamics inherent to primordial debt-peonage was a custom borrowed by Graeco-Roman 
civil law philosophers to construct the “code of conduct” for the creditor (master) and the 
debtor (slave). For the purposes of this project, the terms code of conduct and civil or 
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customary law are used interchangeably because the master-slave codes of conduct were 
deeply rooted in Graeco-Roman laws.  
In early Greek and Roman thought, the conventional thought of “ruling and being 
ruled [were] not only among the things that are inevitable, but also among things that are 
beneficial, and some creatures are marked out to rule or to be ruled right from the moment 
they come into existence” (Wiedemann, 1980; pp. 18). This conventional wisdom was 
possibly derived from Aristotle’s theory on ‘natural slaves.’ Paul Millett (2007) understood 
Aristotle’s dialectic of master-slave relations to mean: “The person with foresight is naturally 
(phusei) ruler and master; the one that can carry out labour is naturally a slave. In this way, 
master and slave have the same interest” (Ibid; pp. 181). Even Euripides, the ancient Greek 
poetic philosopher, believed that barbarians (synonymous to foreigners, outsiders, or 
uncivilized peoples), by nature, were to be ruled by the civilized Graeco-Roman people. It 
then becomes paramount to examine Graeco-Roman slaves’ identity, which does not come 
from the master alone but from his labor and the ‘natural laws’ that defined his servile status. 
In regards to his master, to say the least, the slave’s indebtedness was absolute; in essence he 
was converted into ‘thinghood,’ living for the sole purpose of his master’s livelihood. 
Notions of “natural slaves” were discussed in gruesome terminologies that often 
provoked fear in ancient city-states. Tacitus’s Historie and Ananals put heavy emphasis of 
the crude souls of slaves, often times portraying them as outright vicious beings. The most 
notable case is when he describes the murder of wealthy senator, L. Pedanius Secundus, in 61 
C.E. to be committed by a ‘false Nero’ man thought to be his slave (Jones, 1956; pp. 185: 
Bradley, 1987; pp. 34: For Pedanius Secundus’s slave estimation see Finley, 1980; pp. 80). 
Tacitus presumed that slaves were innately reckless humans that should be controlled by fear. 
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He was ‘barbaric,’ ‘uncivilized,’ ‘foreign’ etc., and needed to be enclosed away from citizens 
of the polis until his master civilized him. Slaves only “apprehend logos, but free men fully 
possess it” so they were slaves by the will of gods’ (Millett, 2007; pp. 184). In this sense, 
slaves are by divine right objects of masters and socially indebted to them; they were objects 
of exploitation. In accordance with the Aristotelian notion of a ‘natural slave,’ a slave was 
simply ‘property with a soul.’ However, in what forms did slave masters exploit their 
servants? What were slaves’ lives like in old fashion slave societies? 
 
Who controlled slaves and how were they used in ancient slave societies? 
 In asking, “who controlled slaves?,” one must uncover what customs determined a 
freeborn citizen, a freedman, and a slave. As previously stated, the slave was a chattel human 
whom existed for the sole purpose of being exploited by his master. In regards to the free 
man, he is someone that is acknowledged as an unbounded citizen with free will. The free 
man is a person recognized by the republic as an individual subject of the State, endowed 
with rights to reproduce himself— the right to provide subsistence for ones’ self and to enjoy 
leisure however one deems fit. It is also important to note that the free man was, by nature, 
entitled to the spoils of the earth, which included ‘natural slaves.’ As for freedmen, we must 
examine the process by which slaves became freed persons to understand the civil customs 
that determined the status of freedmen and freedwomen.   
 
 Manumission (freeing a slave) 
 Graeco-Roman historians broadly acknowledge the importance of manumission as an 
essential civil custom incorporated in the institution of slavery. Bradley (1987) saw 
manumissions as inherent to slavery because it showed slaves that their indebtedness to their 
masters was not necessarily infinite (Ibid; pp. 81: Joshel, 2010; pp. 42). Some servile laws 
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were even defined by the preconceived notion of ‘clean slates’ in which after a set amount of 
years slaves were automatically released from his objective state. An example of this is 
expressed in Augustus’ legal reforms in late first century B.C. when he suggested “that at 
Rome domestic slaves…[be] manumitted at about the age of thirty” (Wiedemann, 1981; pp. 
51: primary source Cicero, Philippic 8, 11.32). Manumission was the ‘social rebirth’ for 
many slaves coming in a variety of forms: a slave could become free upon birthing a child or 
having dependents, he could also gain freedom from his master to be granted a managerial 
possession by his patron, and sometimes a slave was freed for the purpose of marrying the 
master (Ibid; pp. 25). Upon his emancipation, however, there were still legal restrictions that 
separated the freedman from the freeborn man.  
 Freedmen had many civil rights. First and foremost manumitted slaves’ legal status as 
property was expunged, they could legally marry and have socially acknowledged children, 
they could also own and sell property, and enter into contract agreements (Joshel, 2010; pp. 
42). However, the importance lies in the civil customs freed persons were not entitled to and 
the social treatment they received from the freeborn citizenry. Many freeborn Roman citizens 
more times than not viewed manumitted slaves as less than a citizen and thus legal barriers 
were often placed between freedmen and their patrons. By law a freed slave could only sue 
his patron with magistrate permission, which was rarely allowed. In Digest (47.10.7.2) 
Ulpian emphasizes the commonality of praetors’ inflicting “light beatings” on freedmen. In 
relation to public law, they were denied the right to officialdom since they did not come from 
Roman citizenry initially. To keep them in a permanent possession of low class status, 
“Freedmen and freedwomen could not marry a member of a senatorial family” (Joshel, 2010; 
pp. 46). Though legally free, manumitted slaves were second-class citizens that exemplified a 
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dividing line between slaves and freeborn men. When it comes down to comparing and 
contrasting the freedman’s social status in relation to freeborn citizens and in relation to 
slaves, the lines become somewhat blurred.  
Freed slaves presented a new social group to the Roman world. They were individuals 
that reflected a servile past on the rode to Roman citizenry. By way of manumission, 
freedmen and freedwomen embodied hope for slaves in bondage. They represented a class of 
people that evolved from mere objects to a quasi-Roman subject with legal rights. This is 
what separated the freed population from slaves, the principle of property rights. The very act 
of lawful manumission shows us that early slave-societies were not fixated on the indefinite 
servitude of conquered slaves. ‘Clean slates’ expressed in manumission were often granted to 
slaves as a mechanism for alleviating their natural indebtedness to his civilized authorities. 
Historically, grace cycles or ‘clean slates’ were granted to relieve the socio-economic 
stigma of indefinite servitude due to debt. It was not uncommon for pre Graeco-Roman kings 
in Sumeria and Babylonia to announce “public amnesties” (commonly known as 
“declarations of freedom”) that freed debt-peons from servitude. Known as amargi (return to 
mother), all indebted individuals had the ability to return to a subject status. Meaning they 
were entitled to property rights and therefore detached from the slave label. 
 The Book of Exodus denoted that the year of Jubilee was a sacred and civil obligation 
of Israelites to God in which “Given the sacredness of the number seven in ancient Israelite 
culture, a cycle of ‘seven weeks of years,’ or forty-nine years, would have indicated a 
heightened sense of holiness for the jubilee year” (Fanucii, 2014; pp. 5: for further 
elaboration see Leviticus, 25:8). The purpose of Jubilee, Fancuii notes, is to free individuals 
in servitude from indebtedness to other humans because “The burden of debt is clearly 
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understood as contrary to God’s will for humankind” (Ibid; pp. 8).  There is little empirical 
evidence that suggests oral laws prior to Greek and Roman slave societies permanently 
punished someone for debt. Later in civilizations’ development in the Middle Ages, Hebrew 
and Frankish Laws prohibited slaves from being permanently held in their undercaste status 
while outlawing Jews participation in Christian slave trade (Bradley, 1975; pp. 12). These 
societies, to say the least, are often understood to be pre-civil societies whom relied more so 
on social pledges than legal codes of conduct. 
As part of the ancient slave codes, manumission must be discussed when talking 
about Greaco-Roman slavery because it was an extension of slavery as a legal institution. It 
was a system designed to funnel foreigners, no matter what skin tone one had, into the social 
order of city-states. Manumission was a lawful system by which slaves mobilized outside of 
their natural status as “a piece of property”. “In juristic terms, he was “transformed from an 
object to a subject of rights, the most complete metamorphosis one can imagine. He was now 
a human being unequivocally, in Rome even a citizen’” (Finley, 1980; pp. 97). Manumission 
was a literal and figurative act of alleviating the debt burden inflicted on wartime slaves, it 
was a transcending force for conquered slaves.   
               Slave Labor and Services: 
One could argue that the Romans were seeking to reform conquered societies to their 
way of life through employing their services for the good of Roman culture. This is shown by 
the notion that Roman slaves, both public and domestic, did not form a rigid labor class. It 
was common for slaves to be split into two categories: the familia urbana (city slaves) and 
familia rustica (country slaves) albeit they generally performed jobs in both settings. The 
military-coinage-slave complex could arguably qualify as one the most important multiplexes 
of the Graeco-Roman cultures. The cultural and civil development of ancient civilizations 
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was in large part due to its slave population. The natural standings of conquered peoples— 
prisoners of war— in Greek polis and Roman civitas were concrete: Whether a freed person 
or a slave in bondage, one was by nature a civil misfit. The presumption that slaves are 
naturally incapable of comprehending social laws resembled their status as barbarians. It was 
the ‘divine will’ that some people were naturally predisposed to their position as servile 
laborers and the way in which their productive capacity was employed was up to the master. 
It is then reasonable to analyze the usage of slave labor and to toil with the ideal of ancient 
slave labor forming a division of labor.  
As noted by K.R. Bradley’s (1987) Slaves and Masters in the Roman Empire– “slaves 
did not form a rigid class system”, for the jobs of slaves ranged from “agriculture and 
pastoral farming, industry and commerce, domestic and private service, medicine and 
education, and military services” (Ibid; pp. 15). It is not until African slavery in the New 
World that we see slaves forming a rigid class. Some slaves worked under brutal conditions 
like those mining metallic content in Laurium or those whom were forced by Plautus to work 
in flourmills in the late third and early second centuries BCE (Joshel, 2010; pp. 120). For 
military services, some anthropologists acclaim that slaves did not fight in wars because they 
were a social duty of freeborn men and freedmen. To fight during wars signaled one’s 
citizenry and thus his status as a property owner. In fact, enlisting in the army was a way in 
which citizens identified themselves as free men because their motive for registering was 
based on protectionism: They were protecting their property (including their slaves) from 
foreign invaders. However, the military-coinage-slave complex has clearly suggested a 
militaristic role for Graeco-Roman slaves; they were the labor source for extracting the State 
commodity money used to fund wartime efforts and geographical expansion.  
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The interest here is in domestic slave labor because it provides a concrete look into 
the division of slave labor. Jennifer Glancy’s (2000) intriguing analysis of the Matthean 
Parables breaks down domestic slave labor:   
…in the parable of the weeds and wheat (13:24-30) are agricultural slaves. In the 
parables of the wicked tenants (21:33-41) and the wedding banquet (22:1-10), slaves 
serve as messengers or emissaries. Since the master expects the slaves in the parable of 
the wicked tenants to return with the rent, it may also be that he entrusts them with 
handling his funds [as financial assistant]. Although there are no clear indications 
regarding the work of the unmerciful slave (or the slave he abuses), the magnitude of his 
debt to his owner suggests that he is deeply involved in household financial affairs 
(18:23-35). To lesser but still significant degrees the slaves in the parable of the talents 
(25:14-36) serve as their master’s financial agents. Finally, the master in the parable of 
the overseer (24:45-51) entrusts the enslaved overseer with managing an important part 
of his property: his other slaves. 
  – Glancy, 2000; pp. 71  
 
In sum, Glancy notes, “The Matthean representation of the slave as a body to be used and 
abused serves as a counterevidence to the categorization of master-slave relationships” (Ibid; 
pp. 74).  The counterevidence presents a new subject-object discourse involving the overseer 
slave and the domestic slaves subject to his beatings. Resulting from this broad distribution 
of domestic slave labor emerges a new dichotomy that emphasizes a new class of slaves 
within the broader framework: the managerial slaves. Masters sometimes leased slaves 
belonging to the industrial labor force (Xenophon noted that in forth century BCE Nicias 
leased his slaves for entrepreneurial mining services at 1 obolo a day), while others became 
tenants of their masters in the sense that they produced commodities to pay rent and pocketed 
the surplus product (Jones, 1956; pp. 188). 
Thus we see that, indeed, slaves in ancient Graeco-Roman cultures did not form a 
rigid class because their services ranged on a broad spectrum. Some slaves were even 
compensated for their labor monetarily. Slave institutions from this time period are very 
distinct from slavery that manifested in the New World. However, similarities still exist. The 
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fact that slaves were treated as barbaric outsiders naturally incapable of being a “civil 
servant” was used in the context of New World slavery; therefore, the subject-object relation 
persisted in the form of the slave being his master’s property. A key difference lies in the fact 
that slaves of the New World were determined by physique; the color of ones’ skin 
determined their natural status as a slave. Another change that occurred is along the lines of 
slave labor, for slaves of the New World formed a rigid class: they were agriculture laborers 
generally. The evolution from ancient Graeco-Roman servitude to New World race-based 
slavery starts with the idea that skin tone could be applied to one’s natural indebtedness to 
God and the “masters of mankind”. What is race-based slavery, though? What are the 
contextual implications of this newfound institution of slavery? How was it justified? And 
how was slave labor and services employed in the New World economy?  
  
 Slavery in the New World: Race-Based 
 Indebtedness in the Atlantic Slave Trade 
 
 
Precursor to Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: Medieval Slave Trade in the Mediterranean
           Region 
 As history shows, servile culture has been a part of the socio-economic structure in 
archaic city-states centuries before the Atlantic slave trade took form. There are vast 
differences in New World slavery from that of archaic slavery, however. These differences 
occur as a result of race-based customs and the historical context this new form of slavery 
sprouted from. Phillip Morgan (2005) traces race-based slavery to that of Muslim and Islamic 
cultures in the medieval setting. In northern Africa, there has been a history of racial slavery 
since the seventh century with millions of Africans belonged to the slave class “across the 
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Sahara desert, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean to North Africa, the Mediterranean, and Persian 
Gulf” (Ibid; pp. 51).  
The slave class did not belong exclusively to people of African descent. Morgan notes 
that between 1500 and 1800 over a million Western Europeans were enslaved by Muslims. 
However, racial identity did reflect ones’ slave status relative to the work they performed; 
“while Muslims enslaved many so-called ‘white’ people, medieval Arabs came to associate 
the most degrading forms of labor with black slaves. The Arabic word for slave, “abd, came 
to mean a black slave. Many Arab writers had racial contempt for black people…” (Ibid; pp. 
52). Later European slave masters borrowed this custom when they allowed the mixed races, 
mulattos, melungeons, quadroons, etc., to work as domestic slaves while the pure-breed 
African worked the fields (Pinkett, 1950; pp. 213). 
 It was the presumption that African slaves were acclimated to the conditions of 
harvesting sugar crops, which led to Africans being the most highly sought out servile labor 
source for sugar plantations. Such conditions included laboring in tropical climates, habitats 
with harsh epidemiological environments many Africans tended to be generally immune to. 
African slaves were a durable labor source. Investment in the black slave would assure one 
derived surplus value out of his work because his life expectancy was high in tropical 
climates where the cash crop (sugar) grew sufficiently. Thus the rise of black slavery in the 
Western world is largely connected to the Western world’s obsession with sugar plantations 
as the cash crop of the time. Equally important, Europeans had an infatuation with the black 
physique and everything that distinguished it from white biological features, all the more 
reason to disassociate white Europeans from their slaves in the public light.  
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  With the Ottoman Turks’ capture of Constantinople in 1453, European merchants 
increasingly looked toward Africans as a sufficient slave labor source. Muslim and Islamic 
caravan trade in North Africa provided an institutional design for European racialized 
slavery. However, racial slavery was not simply based on contrasting identities between 
Africans and white Europeans. For example, Iberian colonizers enslavement of Atlantic 
Islanders (Guanche Islanders) later in the fifteenth century was the prelude to European 
relations with native inhabitants of the New World. According to Price (2015) the “Iberian 
Peninsula served as a model for the English to emulate. Along with the terms ‘Negro,’ the 
English borrowed a conceptual apparatus for understanding people of African descent as 
subordinate beings, savage, lawless, heathen, dissolute, and subhuman” (Ibid, 78; Morgan, 
2005; pp. 53).  
The importance lies in the fact that native Islanders and Africans were exploitative 
labor sources for sugar production; slaves began to form a rigid labor class in Western modes 
of production. In fact, Sno Tome constructed the “universality of slave labor” acting as the 
“American prototype” for employing slave labor (Morgan, 2005; pp. 53). African slaves 
provided imperial states such as the Dutch, Portuguese, and British with a vast supply of 
laborers basically depopulating Senegambia. There was a “wanton destruction of the 
productive forces, especially the laboring classes” when Europeans commenced the trans-
Atlantic slave route. The reason African and native slaves were able to form a static labor 
class is due to their adaptability to climates under which sugar crops were harvested. They 
generally overcame tropical diseases (such as malaria) that brought many European 
bondsmen to their deathbed. In the early 1600s, there was an increase in “input labor power 
from Africa”—  “New World output of sugar in 1600 was around 10,000 tons; by 1660 it 
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was around 30,000. Sugar prices dropped by half between the 1620s and the 1670s...” (Qiu, 
2016; pp. 32). Relative prices dropped in sugar as a result of the productivity of forced slave 
labor. For example, slave labor in Barbados and other West Indies’ territories were producing 
sugar as well, so by the time sugar plantations took off in America a global market for the 
commodity was conditioned to absorb the surplus sugar produced in the South. It could be 
understood that over-production came by way of omnipresent forced labor practices on all 
sugar plantations that hosted slaves. With high capital returns in terms of surplus value 
extracted from fixed slave capital, it could be explained why the price of sugar could 
generally diminish as overall profit rates incline. 
                               
 
 The Construction of Racism in the New World Identity:                 
In Medieval Europe it was not uncommon to relate people of African descent to the 
Biblical Ham— in that God cursed Ham and all his descendants, therefore Africans, by way 
of the Christian God, are natural slaves. In Genesis 9:18-27, Ham “saw his father’s, [Noah], 
nakedness…When Noah awoke…he said, ‘Cursed be Canaan! The lowest of slaves will he 
be to his brothers…May Canaan be the slave of Shem…and may Canaan be [Japheth’s] 
slave’” (see Nyquest, 2008; pp. 361: Morgan, 2005: Lawance and Pilditch, 2008; pp. 72). It 
was through the name of Christ himself that the Roman Catholic Church justified their 
investment in the enslavement of millions of Africans. As the biggest stockholders in John 
Law’s slave trade in Louisiana, “The Catholic Church maintained a position on the Board of 
Directors of the Company of the Indies…” (Thrasher, 1995; pp. 29).  
Analyzing racial slavery in the New World is a convoluted task. There are many 
directions one could take when it comes to tracing race-based slavery in Western European 
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traditions. The goal here is not to trace the history of racial slavery but instead to focus on 
institutions and social relations that determined the identity of African slaves. In the New 
World:  
 
Slavery—the lawful sale and exploitation of human beings—has been the ultimate 
example of people and societies at their worst, the worst possible way to benefit 
from the labor of another. Few can doubt that the owning, breeding, trading, and 
working of slaves for profit was one of the most repulsive aspects of American 
economic history, even though prominent scholars had once argued, not too many 
decades ago, that the institution of slavery was neither profitable nor central to the 
main currents of American law and society.    
 
         – Park, 2013; pp. 34 
 
When seeking the origins of slavery in the New World, it is important to trace the 
history of Columbus’ conquest. Price (2015) notes that “racialized slavery in the Americas 
began as soon as Columbus navigated down the coast of the Caribbean island” where a “half 
dozen Caribs” were abducted to serve as private translators (Ibid; 76). Juan Gines Sepulveda, 
Alvaro Cabeza de Vaca, and Bartolome de las Casa documented the harsh realities 
experienced by native Islanders undergoing European genocide from the mid-sixteenth 
through early seventeenth centuries. Cabeza de Vaca’s gave an account of his interactions 
with ‘Amerindians’ on his trials through Naufragious (North America). He along with four 
other crewmembers, out a total of six hundred, survived the Pánfilo de Narváez misfortunes 
when attempting to conquer Native Americans on the Gulf Coast of Florida in 1527 (Voigt, 
2009; pp. 57-58). The narratives portrayed in his memoirs jotted in Relación (1555)— 
historically known to be dedicated to Charles V— painted images of ‘Amerindians’ in 
gruesome fashion. Lisa Voigt’s (2009) Writing Captivity in the Early Modern Atlantic 
thought the works of Cabeza de Vaca were edited and revised to “create and enhance his self-
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image” by protagonizing himself and developing a hostile dialogue towards Native Indians 
(Ibid; pp. 62).  
Bartolomé de las Casas (1542) took account of the Spaniard’s colonization of 
Hispaniola illustrating their intentions, respective of their relations to the Native inhabitants, 
to be somewhat genocidal because they embarked on “a number of three million souls” but in 
less than half a century the aggregate population of Natives plummeted to about two hundred 
in total (Wood, 2016; pp. 35). Enslaving native Caribs was also taking form. However, once 
the African slave population grew to great numbers in the New World, racialized institutions 
became solidified as part of the New World identity. Race itself is a New World construction 
in which “white racism and white supremacy” allows for “whiteness itself as a social 
structure…[constituted] by dehumanizing and dominating other people they define as non-
white for that purpose” (Martinot, 2007, 2010; pp. 66).   
 Applying race to slavery “elicited debasement through physically demanding labor” 
for the imposed “debasement was thus attributed to the essential nature of the enslaved 
people, a representation used as a means of justifying their enslavement” (Hayes, 2013; pp. 
7). In the New World, Aristotelian notions of a “natural slave” molded itself to strictly rely 
on race as means to dehumanize and objectify people of African descent. The African lineage 
was indebted to the Christian God and his followers, so their labor activity was a socialized 
credit-debt exchange. Their “essential nature” was one of submission, one that reflected their 
object status as chattel labor. Angela Davis (2003) asserted that in the U.S. “chattel slavery 
was a system of forced labor that relied on racist ideas and beliefs to justify the relegation of 
people of African descent to the legal status of property” (Ibid; pp. 25). African slaves’ legal 
status as property in the New World was a racial construct that spoke to the inherent nature 
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of slaves as simply a productive tool. Chattel laborers were the primitive capital in the British 
Colonies. However, no nation prior to Western European Atlantic slave trade benefitted more 
from the surplus value created by slave labor.  
 
Colonial Slavery Solidified: A Lawful Tradition  
Governing the bodies of African slaves created the New World discourse for 
institutionalizing racialized systems of oppression. The year 1619 is an essential year in 
American history. It is referenced that in 1619 the first twenty chattel Africans crossed the 
colonial borders at Jamestown, Virginia (McColley, 1986; Higginbotham, 2013; pp. 46). We 
do not know much about the status of these slaves as documented by the only witness of this 
event John Rolfe, but there is consistency in the number of African slaves (twenty) brought 
to the shores of Virginia. Katherine Hayes notes Nathaniel and Grissell Sylvester settled near 
New York somewhere between 1652 and 1653 as private venture capitalists. Seeking to 
exploit the business prospects offered by plantation systems established in Barbados and 
other Caribbean territories, they became indulged in servile labor customs. Nathaniel 
Sylvester “assembled a heterogeneous group of laborers— African, Native American, and 
possibly poor English or Irish” thereby in 1680 his plantation had the “largest holdings of 
enslaved persons in New York,” a sum total of twenty-three persons (Hayes, 2013; pp. 2). 
Hayes notes that these individuals performed many tasks both domestically and on the 
plantations, so they were not homogenized in their labor. Since racialized production in 
America was not yet instituted, servile labor on the Sylvester Plantation varied widely. As the 
number of Southern plantations multiplied, however, African slave labor became ascribed to 
plantations as their forced migration grew rapidly in the late seventeenth century. For 
example, in Virginia:  
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By 1648 the white population had risen to 15,000 and the black to 300, still 2 
percent. By 1670 there were 38,000 whites but the percentage of blacks had risen to 
5 percent, or 2,000. These figures suggest that the proportion of blacks to whites did 
not rise significantly in the 1630s or 1640s, but began to increase at some point 
between 1648 and 1660…it seems likely that the number of blacks in Virginia more 
than doubled in the 1650s, and then doubled again in the 1660s.  
 
– McColley, 1986; pp. 11 
 
The population of African slaves was growing in the colonies to the point that 
universal laws for slaves had to be constructed. One of the most disheartening features of 
slavery in Colonial America was the prohibition of miscegenation. Blacks were seen as 
“oversexed”. To highlight the uncontrollable nature of “oversexed” slaves, Re Davis in 1630 
ordered the whipping of a white man, Hugh Davis, for defying God by sleeping with a slave 
because the slave had no self-control (Craig, 2001). Similarly, in 1691 Virginia enacted a law 
that banned interracial marriage— the penalty for doing so resulted in permanent exile from 
the colony. In fact, this law persisted up until the mid-twentieth century constitutional case 
Loving v. Virginia which banned such practices (Wallenstein, 2009; pp. 330-331). A law in 
1662 transformed the black female slave into an exploitative sex object for the masters’ 
pleasures. This law created a matrilineal order of slave descent: “Negro women’s children to 
serve according to the condition of the mother…” (Hening, 1810). As a result, male slave 
masters covertly, sometimes rather conspicuously, sexually abused and even impregnated 
black female slaves for the purpose of reproducing his labor force (Milburn and Conrad, 
2016; pp. 148: see Davis, 1981: Conrad and Meyer, 1964). This caused rather harsh relations 
between female slaves and masters’ wives in general.   
Fredrick Douglass gives an account of the inhuman treatment black female slaves had 
to endure because of white women’s resentment for them. The “wife of Mr. Giles Hick”, he 
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states, “murdered my wife’s cousin, a young girl between fifteen and sixteen years of 
age…[because she] did not hear the [baby] crying…[Mrs. Hicks] jumped from her bed, 
seized an oak stick of wood by the fireplace, and with it broke the girl’s nose and breastbone, 
and thus ended her life” (see Blight’s second edition of Douglas’ narrative, 2006; pp. 58). 
There was little acknowledgment of black slaves in the social context as people; they were 
animate objects masters could derive pleasure from, whether that be in the form of sexual 
intercourse or physical abuse.  
There was no shortage when it came to overseers’ employment of physical abuse. In 
fact, Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman (1974) believe there was an “optimum use of 
force” masters and overseers used to create an efficient method for getting maximum 
compliance out of slave labor, the goal being to optimize surplus value created by his slave 
labor. Surplus value of slave labor begins at the point when slaves have produced just enough 
commodities for sale to pay off his master’s investment in him. However, in the master-slave 
dialectic, the slave never truly pays off his debt for his livelihood as it depends on his 
master’s provisioning of subsistence resources. It is recognized that weekly rations of 
foodstuffs were distributed to field workers whereas one or two outfits were given to them 
annually. Masters invested in the bare minimum subsistence of his slaves but there was 
nonetheless a constant stream of capital flowing out of the master’s pocket for the 
maintenance of his slave labor. For this reason slaves’ indebtedness to his master was 
indefinite because they were a lifetime investment— profits were accumulated as long as 
slave masters could increase output above the level needed to cover his investment in slave 
capital. 
Of course the product of slave labor (i.e., sugar and cotton) belonged to the master. 
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The slave owner also determined the production processes of such commodities and 
sometimes he failed to capitalize on his investment in slaves because of “rule by fear” 
traditions in the New World. Masters frequently whipped slaves, sometimes to their lives’ 
end, which devalued slaves’ worth on markets or led to a loss in owners’ capital. “Because 
slaves who were badly scarred had a lower market value, some slaveholders developed 
alternative punishment techniques, such as the use of a cowhide paddle that inflicted 
considerable pain but left no scars” (Milburn and Conrad, 2016; pp. 146). Fredrick Douglass 
gave an account of the gruesome force of Colonel Lloyd’s overseer Mr. Gore. A slave, by the 
name of Demby, was being whipped by Mr. Gore before breaking loose to seek shelter in a 
deep pond. Soon enough, Mr. Gore “raised his musket to [Demby’s] face…and blood and 
brains marked the water where he had stood [in the water]” (Blight, 2006; pp. 57). However, 
because the crime was committed in front of slaves, they could not testify in court on behalf 
of victims of unlawful acts, so there was no trial. Another gruesome event accounted for in 
Douglass’ narrative is when Mr. Bondly, the neighbor of Colonel Lloyd, caught an older 
slave fishing to make up “for deficiency in scanty allowances” and “blew his deadly contents 
into the poor old man” (Ibid; pp. 58). Instantly, Mr. Bondly endeavored to “pay Colonel 
Lloyd for his property” as a way of compensating for the loss in slave capital.  
Slavery fabricated extreme hostile environments for chattel laborers. Slave parents 
often beat their kids as preparation for the treatment they would endure from masters and 
overseers (Milburn and Conrad, 2016; pp. 146). As discussed in the Matthean parables, the 
slave body was used and abused as a way of coercing optimum production and also social 
isolation from the citizenry. Quite literally, African slaves’ body, like the slave bodies 
discussed in Matthean slave parables, was marked by the whip to stress his inhuman nature 
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and chattel status.  
Captured in a New York Daily Tribune report on December 20, 1859, a pro-slavery 
lawyer and activist by the name O’Connor— his first name was not published in the report— 
gave a rally speech in which he stated:  
“[The] Negro…has strength, and he has power to labour; but the Nature which 
created that power has denied him either the intellect to govern or the willingness to 
work…And that nature which denied him the will to labour gave him a master to 
coerce that will…it is not injustice to leave the Negro in the condition in which 
nature placed him…”  
    
 – emphasized in Millett, 2007; pp. 178 
 
African slave ideologues like O’Connor were at the forefront of pro-slavery legislation prior 
to the American Civil War. The political war between ‘Slave Power’ politicians and the 
progressive Republicans prompted a “sectional crisis”; eventually, incidences that created 
what came to be known as Bleeding Kansas marked the start to the violent American Civil 
War (Gienapp, 1986). Civil War Northern Slave codes varied from colony to colony prior to 
the American Revolution but there was ubiquity regarding the African slave for they were all 
treated as animate objects. Slave codes were the legislative tool that stamped African slaves 
as strictly property without the possession of social rights endowed in freeborn Europeans. 
Arguably the Three-Fifths Compromise of 1787, a series of Fugitive Slave Laws from 1793-
1850, the Missouri Compromise of 1820, the Compromise of 1850, and the Dred Scott 
Decision 1857 illustrated progressivity in the moral discourse on slavery in America. Such 
legislations would soon determine the faith of America’s identity as a sovereign nation state 
(Lowance and Pilditch, 2008; pp. 67).  
A slew of slave laws were passed in the 1700s as the slave population continued to 
grow in the South. In 1740, South Carolina brought forward the Negro Act that severed the 
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link between slaves and literacy. “Europe and America saw literacy as a sign of cultural and 
racial superiority— one used to justify the treatment of black slaves as chattel” (Rasmussen, 
2010; pp. 202). Literacy laws were sweeping across the colonies as a mechanism that further 
converged the white American class by alienating blacks from properly speaking and writing 
in the English language. By 1755, Georgia had enacted its own slave literacy law that also 
prohibited all slaves from learning English literary skills. In the early nineteenth century, 
Savannah and Virginia passed ordinances that discouraged slave masters from teaching 
slaves English. Rasmussen believes that it was the illiteracy of slaves that acted as the 
“crucial element in the production of racial difference in North America” (Ibid; 203). 
Fredrick Douglass exemplified the foreseeable threat slave literacy could cause; a threat 
whites feared most. Douglass’s “desire and determination to learn” came from his second 
family, the Auld family in Baltimore, Maryland. Mrs. Auld instructed him up until Mr. Auld 
told her about this “unlawful, as well as unsafe” act; according to Douglass, Mr. Auld stated: 
“A nigger should know nothing but to obey his master— to do as he is told to do. 
Learning would spoil the best nigger in the world. Now…if you teach that nigger 
how to read, there would be no keeping him. It would forever unfit him to be a 
slave. He would at once become unmanageable, and of no value to his master.” 
         – Blight, 2006; pp. 63-64 
 
Here the slave is reduced to the ultimate state of a chattel being that possesses no human 
rights let alone civil rights. African slaves would “spoil” if they learned the ways of the civil 
subject; subjugating black slaves to forced labor practices in the South was their only purpose 
and social value. The only semi-human connection slaves had was implied in the Three-
Fifths Compromise of 1787.  
 
Slave Labor in America’s Cotton Industry 
 Sno Tome constructed a system to employ slave labor in a universal way. There was 
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no true division of labor when it came to how masters utilized their slaves’ productive 
activities. For Karl Marx, African slavery was the prime attribute that advanced the era of 
capitalism:  
 
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and 
entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest 
and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the 
commercial hunting of black-skins, signalised the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist 
production… 
 
    — Marx, 1887; pp. 751 
Thus African slaves could be considered the first form of “primitive accumulation” or 
animate accumulation. They were the “treasures” conquered by European imperialists whom 
transformed the African people as a whole into a form of fixed capital. Converting Africans 
to chattel beings led to immeasurable depopulation on Africa’s West Coast, especially in 
Guinea (now Ghana) where some 650,000 Africans were taken into slavery (Thrasher, 1995; 
pp. 5-6). Primitive slave capital was used as the principle input for the production of cash 
crops, which at the start of the trans-Atlantic slave trade was sugar. However, once king 
cotton was discovered, the Southern economy took capitalists modes of production to a new 
height.  
 W.E.B. Du Bois’ (1896) The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United 
States of America, 1638-1870 gives startling statistics relative of slave labor and cotton 
production in the economic epoch under ‘King Cotton.’ Due to revolutionary technology in 
the mid-to-late eighteenth century— such as James Watt’s steam-engine (1769), Lewis 
Paul’s carding-machine (1748), and Eli Whitney’s cotton-gin (1792)— and an adequate slave 
labor force, “raw cotton rose steadily from 13,000 bales in 1781, to 572,000 in 1820, to 
871,000 in 1830, and to 3,366,000 in 1860” (Ibid; pp. 151). More importantly, with the 
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productive capacity of plantation slaves heightened by technological development, the free 
black population rose from about one hundred thousand at the start of the nineteenth century 
growing to nearly a half million free blacks by 1850 (Trotter, 2000; pp. 20). Looking at the 
dates, it is quite reasonable to suggest that the works of Adam Smith and David Ricardo’s 
capitalist theory are at play, as tied to the scale of cotton production, capital accumulation in 
slave labor, and regional comparative advantage dynamics that commenced in the early 
1800s. Peter Passell and Jeremy Attack (1994) highlight the importance of the protectionist 
state instigated by Jefferson’s embargo on foreign produce from 1807-1815. During this 
rather short trade blockade, industrialization accelerated to new heights, firmly incorporating 
capitalist theories into America’s social wellbeing. By 1815, “territorial division of labor 
between the three great sections of the Union—the West, the South, and the East. Each 
section tended to devote itself more exclusively to the production of those commodities for 
which it was best able to provide” (Passell and Attack, 1994; pp. 167).  
There is also a general understanding that Thomas Jefferson’s 1803 Louisiana 
Purchase was essential to further expand the growing American economy. ‘King Cotton’ in 
the South produced a mouth-watering market for slave masters to employ their unfree 
‘animate’ labor supply. In the most literal sense, outlandish beatings and socio-economic 
dislocation caused by slavery made slaves the physical embodiment of a socially 
programmed being, a being whose life activity could be coerced by the will of others.  
Cotton production increased exponentially between 1820 and 1860 because the slave 
labor force was numerically sufficient and thus, produced surplus goods at an alarming rate. 
For example, by 1860 Southern states had “a total of 12,240,300 people; 65.7 percent of 
these were white, 2.0 percent were free blacks, and 32.3 percent-some 3,950,511 or about 4 
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million- were slaves. In the cotton states, the extent of slaveholding rose dramatically; South 
Carolina was 57.2 percent slave, Mississippi 55.2 percent, Alabama 45.1 percent, Florida 
43.9 percent, Georgia 43.7 percent, and Louisiana 46.9 percent” (Huston, 1999; pp. 253).  
However, Du Bois notes that laws of supply and demand were emerging because cotton 
prices fluctuated dramatically over the four decades between 1820-1860. Alfred Conrad and 
John Meyer (1964) conducted an empirical analysis of the Southern economy’s capital 
investment in slaves and cotton from the early-to-mid eighteenth century and found that “the 
price of slaves fluctuated widely, being subject to the waves of speculation in cotton” (Ibid; 
pp. 50). African slaves were pseudo-human figures thanks to the gerrymandering techniques 
James Wilson and Roger Sherman used to ratify the Three-Fifths Compromise in 1787. What 
matters most for the purpose of this passage lies in the American obsession with slaves as 
animate forms of capital, as individuals that had no control over distinguishing between the 
labor-leisure trade-off when producing commodities.  
The steady increase in cotton production and its demand on global markets led to an 
everlasting dependency on slave labor markets for the purpose of extracting maximum 
surplus value out of slaves. By 1770, slaves represented about 1.5 years of national income 
(Piketty, 2010; pp. 160). Huston (1999) calculated the accumulated slave capital in the South 
and the estimation was striking: slave capital equated to some $3,000,000,000 at the dawn of 
the Civil War (Ibid). Du Bois (1910) estimated that “property in slaves” was “perhaps two 
thousand million dollars” or two billion dollars (Ibid; pp. 781). Slaves net capital value was 
still far more than that of any industry leading up to the Civil War. With the closing of the 
global slave trade in 1834, domestic slave markets gained an important role in the economics 
of Southern slavery (Du Bois, 1896: Conrad, 1964).  The border and Gulf-states were bound 
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by great economic interest in surplus value; the border-states actually became the “slave-
breeding districts” which gave more clout to slave states fighting to hold on to their unfree 
labor supply. Many political and social theorists believe that civil disputes between the North 
and the South were not really based on the morals of American slavery. Rather, they were 
based on the ‘unfree labor’ versus ‘free labor’ discourse in the early-to-mid industrial epoch 
of America. 
 Conclusion: 
Early Graeco-Roman chattel slavery is distinct from Western European style slavery 
based on one pivotal socialized construct: Race. Blackness represented ones’ servile and 
inferior status to free whites; it represented the natural mark of indebtedness by God (note the 
story of Noah’s son, Ham). Natural slave laws in the works of Aristotle bore some 
resemblance to New World slave codes. Precisely written in John Locke’s (1689) Second 
Treatise of Government— “The labour that was mine, removing them out of that common 
state they were in, hath fixed my property in them” (Ibid; pp. 20). Such an idea can be 
expanded to ancient Graeco-Roman imperial expansion and the early European conquest for 
slaves. Whether it is mercenaries hired by the Roman republic or missionaries and navigators 
employed by Charles II to encroach on the trans-Atlantic slave trade, barbaric conquerors and 
African slave traders were the States’ labor supply. They labored for the common good 
Mother Nature offered: the ‘natural slave.’ By removing slaves from their “common state,” 
just as a worker removes any other natural resource from nature, they were by nature animate 
property of the imperial State and its subjects. Their nature as slaves paralleled their identity 
as objects, property, ‘thinghood’ etc. Locke confirms this in defining characteristics of the 
“perfect Despotic power” granted to the “conquerors” of unruly slaves, for they had “just 
power” over those that have “unjustly taken up arms against him” (Nyquest, 2008; pp. 375). 
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The realities of African slaves were not aligned with this presumption although the barbaric 
slaves in ancient Greece and Roman did conform to this notion. For African slaves that 
underwent forced migration to the Americas between 1619-1834, their “deformed” physical 
features predetermined their faith as slaves in the New World.  
 Many contrasting features are present as well when relating Graeco-Roman prisoners-
of-war to the New World’s African slaves. Race is the immediate topic for discourse. 
Broadly noted by many historians and sociologists studying American slavery, the social 
construction of racial identities has its essence in Western European states involved in the 
Atlantic slave trade. Established in ‘the West’ and ‘the Rest’ dialogue, comparing 
Eurocentric nation states to West African countries, a binary national identity between 
African slaves and white Europeans was processed. “[The] West’s sense of itself— its 
identity— was formed not only by internal processes that gradually molded Western 
European countries into a distinct type of society; rather it was through Europe’s sense of 
uniqueness from distant land masses that led to a Eurocentric representation of itself in 
relation to ‘others”’ (Hall, 1996; pp. 188).  
Otherness alienates or externalizes ‘outsiders’ in the broader social context; it is no 
wonder African slaves were on the other end of the spectrum when contrasting their identity 
to that of European descendants in America. The African slave was a source of fixed labor 
capital that could be accumulated and forced to maintain his masters’ profits. Forced labor 
indeed controlled the capitalist modes of production prior to the American Civil War, that is, 
until free wage laborers in the North rallied against Southern oligarchs whom controlled the 
unfree labor supply. Sectionalism was enforced by slave labor in the South and the 
oppositional force of free white laborers in Northern districts. Many Southern whites did not 
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possess a single slave, but the dream of owning slave capital in the future was an illusion 
created by the economic realities of “big house” plantations. It was the American dream of 
capital accumulation in slaves that gave poor whites something to fight for. The “Southerners 
understood that slavery caused the economic prosperity of their region, and that knowledge 
created an economic bond among all whites” (Huston, 1999; pp. 255). The “Northern free 
labor ideology” contested that it was the individual’s will and intelligence that leads to the 
accomplishment of the American Dream. Whereas in the South, the argument was that social 
mobility depended on “property-acquisition— the “fruits of labor”— was accumulating 
slaves” (Ibid; pp. 257). The Civil War commenced with the Battle of Fort Sumter in 1861, 
and lasted until the summer of 1865 when the last Confederate General Stand Watie was 
captured by Union troops.  
The Southern Reconstruction Era (1863-1877) could not be undermined for the social 
customs and institutions, legislative laws, and capitalist modes of production incorporated 
during that period of American history are reflected in the contemporary reality. The 
restoration of “Home Rule” in the South reorganized the ‘white superior complex’ in post-
slavery America and as for freedmen, a new chattel system was molded in place of slavery: 
Convict leasing. Incarceration for contractual debt and breaking Black Codes in the South 
displaced the white prisoner by isolating such customs to strictly reflect black criminality. 
Following the Civil War, freedmen became the prime targets for imprisonment and, once 
again, black bodies were funneled to the very plantations they were freed from with 
Lincoln’s 1863 Emancipation Proclamation. 
 Sharecropping, convict leasing, and Jim Crow laws in the South further disconnected 
freedmen from the American Dream. However, these socialized customs were not separate 
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from the new peculiar institution (prisons); Jim Crow laws and the sharecropping system 
fueled the convict leasing movement in the late nineteenth century Southern economy. Is it 
then reasonable to say prison confinement became a racial institution post-American Civil 
War? Under what conditions were individuals confined and what were the general 
experiences of confinement in early prisons and jails? These questions are parallel to the 
approach taken in the next chapter. In terms of contractual debt practices, prisons and jails 
were morphed into State institutions to force freedmen back to plantations. However, the 
rode to this tradition has deep historical significance for debt-peonage as a part of tribal 
customs (servile labor for criminal debt was encompassed in wergeld justice) before civil law 
was conceived in Greek and Roman city-states.  
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               Chapter 3 
     The Evolution of Debt Prisoners  
 
  The Development of Monetary Justice Systems: 
How Did Black Bodies Become Criminalized and 
   Exploited in Jurisprudence Practices? 
 
Southerners disputed the dictates of laissez-faire economics, claiming that slavery 
did maximize the economic welfare of the community. And, like advocates of the 
penitentiary, proponents of chattel slavery protested that their institution also 
performed a crime control function by disabling the crime-prone population of 
slave states. If freed, this population would produce “numerous banditti” preying 
on the property of others.   
 
                   – Adam J. Hirsch, 1992; pp. 83  
  
Systems of punitive confinement have been around since ancient Greece. Daniel D’Amico 
(2010) establishes an interesting way one could perceive punitive systems in ancient Athens 
(800-400 B.C.); through the Draconian codes of seventh century BCE followed by Solon’s 
legislative reforms in sixth century Athens, criminal confinement became a public service 
(Ibid; pp. 465: Peacock, 2016). What is more interesting about the legislative reformation in 
early Greek polis is the establishment of Athenian timêtês (tax collectors and property 
censors), the Court of Areopagus, and dicasts (judges) (Peacock, 2016; pp. 77: Morgan, 
1877; pp. 262: Hudson, 2004; pp. 103-104). For the most part, activity of the courts in the 
ancient city-states revolved around collecting financial obligations in the form of socialized 
	65		
penalties like taxes and tribute payments. The advancement of the polis life itself cannot be 
disassociated from the history of publicly enforced monetary sanctions via judicial processes. 
This itself forces one to take heed of the evolution of debt peonage in light of money as an 
institution instilled in redistributive justice. As discussed in chapter I, wergeld systems were 
based on oral customs that integrated individuals’ property and capital within the framework 
of justice. The crucial point to remember about wergeld justice is that it was first constructed 
as means to impose in-kind payments between individual parties involved in violent 
conflicts. It was used to rid personal vendettas and familial blood feuds.  
Debtors’ prisons began with wergeld-like justice systems. Allowing possessions to 
determine ones’ freedom is present in both cases. Take this scenario for an example, it is 
understood by Mark Peacock (2003-2004) that “a person’s wergeld depended on his rank” in 
that “the king had the highest” and the “slaves had none, but their masters were to be 
compensated if their slaves were slain or injured” (Ibid; pp. 215). It is understood that the 
rode to lawful servitude for any chattel person in Medieval Kings’ courts was through their 
inability to pay lawful debts to the harmed party or individuals’ inability to pay State taxes 
and tithes.  
The Estate Satire Canterbury Tales illustrates the history of socialized justice along 
the lines of property entitlement and labor demand. Being a Middle English text, relying on 
glossing for translation purposes was necessary. Geoffrey Chaucer mentions three terms— 
swinken (labor), ferme (rent payment), and love-dayes (court dates)— that vocalize the 
realities of Anglo-Saxon justice. With the trilateral structure of his satire, Chaucer’s 
pilgrimage tales are ordered around social relations and institutions between noble knights 
(puguare), people of the church (orare), and those in serfdom (labore). Knights often hired 
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the serfs to work (swinken) their lands as a way of paying rent debts (ferme) to them 
(knights) and the kingdom. Serfs were a group of property-less individuals valued for their 
labor productivity therefore socialized laws were determinate: “Sergeants of the Law” 
maintained the trilateral order by assuring that the property-less remained the objectified 
undercaste through wergeld justice and socialized State obligations. This outdated sense of 
criminal and civil law intertwined with ones’ commodity assets is still lingering in the 
American criminal justice climate today. The difference is the State and its operators of 
justice are the main beneficiaries of today’s judicial system. They act as the manipulator of 
justice gearing the system to impoverish the already indigent cohort.  
Racialized slavery, one key feature of America’s identity as vividly shown through its 
constitutional amendments, has continuously relied on repressive laws to contain African 
Americans in undercaste status. There is a financial attack on indigent black defendants 
involved with criminal courts, something unprecedented in Anglo-Saxon justice systems. The 
“theory of social justice” defined by John Rawls (1971) seeks to express justice in terms of 
‘fairness.’ In his theory true justice lies in equality in which “all social value [produced by 
fair justice]…is to everyone’s advantage” so “no inequality is tolerable” unless the lowest 
income earners in society marginally benefit from it. The American justice institutions 
function antithetical to a fair and uplifting justice system. Distributive justice produces 
inequality by disavowing impoverished blacks to mobilize; it perpetuates the cycle of crime, 
plight, and unemployment for the at-risk communities disproportionately to that of other 
ethno-racial groups. 
Many ponder about the process by which sovereign States in Medieval Europe 
devised a criminal justice system. There is interest in the links formed between criminal 
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justice systems and money. This chapter attempts to address monetary justice at its core and 
to critically examine its broad usage while also making the case and point that legal financial 
obligations (LFOs) imposed in the United States is historically unique. Its uniqueness comes 
from the deliberate and disproportionate targeting of justice on the basis of race and poverty. 
But to understand such complex network of social relations in the limited space at my 
disposal, Mitchell Innes’ (1932) Martyrdom in Our Times is a critical text to address. 
Specifically because the text examines money and justice systems in early Anglo-Saxon 
societies yet incorporates the history of debt criminality within the analytical framework.  
 
The Make-Up of Criminal Justice Systems in Europe: Mitchell Innes 
 
[The] monetary economy is regulated by some sovereign authority 
structure…highlights the link between money and legal codes, whether formal or 
informal, as well as practices of recompense enforced by communal authority 
structures. 
   
                  – David Singh, 2016; pp. 7 
  
Distributive justice can be thought of as follows: It is a system that constructs justice 
on the basis of ones’ monetary assets or capital net-worth. It can be said that such justice 
systems still depend, as they did with the Yurok Natives in northern California dating back to 
the fourteenth century, on moveable possessions. Adamson Hoebel (1942) corroborated 
Yurok that Natives were primitive fishers and gathers that had a sense of wealth 
accumulation; wealth was represented in objects like dentalium shells, woodpecker scalps, 
and large ceremonial obsidian blades (Ibid; pp. 958). Justice in Klamath River Valley 
between the 1300s-1775 was attained via “imposition and collection of damages, or by 
infliction of bodily harm” in which kinsmen to the chiefdom “arraigned the offender or 
determined the extent of the damages to be assessed…In default, the defendant must become 
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the plaintiff’s debtor-slave” (Ibid; pp. 958). Needless to say, Yurok Natives also had a system 
of distributive justice to enforce ‘Yurok law’ in its communistic society progressing  to a 
class society. 
With the formality of criminal justice institutions in Anglo-Saxon societies, 
distributive justice was well defined and calculated in jurisprudence practices. Patrick 
Wormald (2009) holds that, “pre-Angevin, indeed pre-conquest, development had a far more 
important place in the history of English law than post-Maitland wisdom allows” (Ibid; pp. 
194). By focusing on the twelfth century Latin text Leges Henrici Primi, Wormald finds that 
‘Kings’ Courts’ operated on the basis of “ruthless control” over the mass population. 
Criminal justice reform was taking place in Old English justice systems between the ninth 
and twelfth centuries and it was largely instigated by State imposed financial sanctions. The 
newly formed criminal justice network for the King— Counts (judges), Missi (tax collectors), 
jurors (property confiscators), and Eyres (circuit courts)— became the prime tools of early 
jurisprudence practices.  
Mitchell Innes (1932) gives an extensive history of the traditions of early Anglo-
Saxon jurisprudence practices exemplifying parallels between it and late nineteenth century 
English criminal law procedures. However, for the purpose of a smooth transition, sticking to 
his account of ‘Kings’ law’ in Merovingian and Carolingian Dynasties is crucial. It is known 
that from the Carolingian Dynasty onwards that the Church’s ‘divine law’ and Paganism’s 
‘natural law’, concurring to theologians’ usage of the terms, became interchangeable phrases 
in written doctrines of law (Bloch, 1975; pp. 11). It was the Kings’ need of money during 
periods of sovereign deficits, usually in periods of war, that led to civil and criminal justice 
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practices (Ibid; pp. 26). For this reason, it is impossible to not incorporate distributive justice 
as the foundation of our current judicial practices.  
Fines and fees have always been an intricate part of Old English judicial traditions, 
but it was generally inflicted on the well-to-do class of individuals— not strictly in the form 
of currency payments, however. Innes mentions that the Frankish law between the fifth and 
sixth centuries that a rich man was fined 300 oxen for murder— the term ‘murder’ itself was 
the name of a fine— exemplifies bilateral structure of justice (Ibid; pp. 22, 27). The criminal 
justice system of early Anglo-Saxon states, like those in American justice systems today, 
functioned as a two-tiered judicial design. There was a system of justice for the poor and one 
for the rich. It was no coincidence that the poor worked on the property of kings, rich 
noblemen, and knights for basic subsistence. They rarely received income for their servile 
labor, and they did not own any land to derive independent capital wealth from. It was 
impossible for the poor to ever make the payment of 300 oxen, thus this was a rich man’s 
punishment for murder. Once currency became a source of meeting legal financial 
obligations, the two-tiered justice system became much more apparent as poor men began to 
endure many capital punishments (mostly hangings and floggings), imprisonment for 
insufficient tax payments, and debt servitude. 
There was a “machinery of arresting tax-payers and casting them into prisons” when 
the poor became prime targets of Kings’ Missi or tax assessors. Counts usually assessed 
one’s asset wealth and appropriated a tax relative to it whereas their job inside circuit courts 
was to reap in as much revenue as possible because King’s justices strived to procure 
finances for their sovereign authority and his rich subjects. This ultimately led to an over 
reliance on fines and fees in courts broadening social dislocation amongst the poor. Quite 
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strikingly, this practice is still reflected in criminal justice financial schemes clandestinely 
operating within New Orleans’s criminal justice network, as shown later in this chapter.  
Property laws were a major reason for such harsh treatment towards indigent serfs. 
European wars, according to Innes, led to continuous inflation or devaluation of currency to 
the point that the shilling became the “basis of all taxes”. The reason fluctuations in monetary 
value were forming is very similar to the credibility of the State idea discussed in chapter I. 
Warring states issue its currency as an IOU to the public as a method of collecting resources 
to prepare for war. The shilling, as with all money, acts as the intermediary force in which 
State debt (its IOU to the public) and State imposed obligations (its socialized taxes) are 
denominated. To create more liquidity is to expand State debt, which tends to inflate the 
currency. It also assures the State’s ‘money things’ are accessible to people seeking a 
medium of payment for State imposed debt. This speaks to the importance of having the 
inflated shilling act as the State’s currency.   
  It is presumed that the property-less serfs— prior to the adoption of the shilling as a 
unit of account for criminal financial obligation— were not fined for criminal acts: Their 
masters were. But using the shilling as means of payment for criminal fines and fees led to 
mass imprisonment of the poor because like the rich they, too, now had to pay criminal 
obligations. Most wergeld compensations were imposed on capital felonies like murder and 
manslaughter. Overtime Anglo-Saxon and Germanic laws soon amended “injury, rape, theft, 
and slander” as just means to inflict wergeld compensations on defendants if they were to be 
proven guilty in open court. If a person’s ear was chopped off, the defendant had to pay 30 
shillings; for knocking someone’s teeth out, the suspect had to pay “8 shillings per incisor, 16 
for a molar” (Peacock, 2003-2004; pp. 215). The poor were imprisoned and punished for 
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poverty because they generally could not make such payments working as serfs. But the 
well-to-do class’s punishment was strictly in the form of losing possessions with financial or 
productive utility.   
Jewish bankers were a prime entity operating similarly to modern bail bondsmen 
agencies whom suffered losses from poor men fleeing their debt obligations, but tipstaff and 
watch-men— early bounty hunters— typically caught fleeing debtors and imprisoned them 
(Ibid; pp. 31). Harry Berger Jr.’s (2013) text “A Fury in the Words: Love and Embarrassment 
in Shakespeare’s Venice” understood the character Shylock to be the “play’s only usurer and 
moneylender” thus marking debt with contractually imposed interest rates as an early 
“Jewish practice” (Ibid; pp. 28). It was not uncommon for Jewish bankers to extend interest-
bearing loans to prisoners seeking pre-trial release. The “fictitious credit” lent to the poor 
assured that “creditors are socially powerful usurers and debtors are their weak targets…” 
(Peebles, 2010; pp. 226). The credit is fictitious in the sense that debtors, particularly debt 
prisoners, often times are trapped in debt by paying interest. Thus they end up distributing 
more assets to creditors than the credits they initially received. Gustav Peebles (2010) notes 
that creditors and debtors are entangled in a power struggle that “would be incomplete if we 
were to neglect the issuance of interest and usury” (Ibid; pp. 231). Contracted debtors 
generally seek to transfer future consumption across temporal space by accepting credit from 
lenders as means to consume expected in the future in the present moment. Creditors that 
find greater utility in deferring present consumption for future capital gains (this occurs 
through interest or usury) act as the intermediary force that allows for consumption to be 
nearly unbounded by temporal constraints. As a result, bail bondsmen are a direct result of 
these predatory lending schemes. Prisoners generally support their own consumption, but as 
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indigent people the notion of ‘voluntary’ transfer consumption lacks significance. Debt 
prisoners depended on lines of credit for their everyday subsistence while incarcerated in 
early Anglo-Saxon courts. 
  Here lies the start of indefinite indebtedness initiated by State led judicial practices. 
Jurors, counts, Missi, Eyres, and Jewish banks were designed to act as civil and criminal 
justice frameworks protecting the King’s revenue. The rationale behind Merovingian and 
Carolingian jurisprudence practices was to construct a system that optimized sovereign 
revenue by legalizing State imposed debt obligations in the texts Leges and Lavisse. Not only 
did the system enable kings to maintain revenue through wergeld justice, it also allowed for-
profit entities— Jewish bankers for instance—to formalize a credit system that further 
trapped impoverished debtors in a vicious cycle of social plight. Documented in “Ancient 
Jewish History: Banking and Bankers” (2008), by eight century A.D. Jahbadhiyyi was the 
formal term for Jewish merchant bankers that used their wealth to fund economic activity. In 
fact, it is known that the Jewish families of ancient Jerusalem formulated the first banking 
system by way of imposing tithes (known as Ma’aser sheni): The temples used store tithes 
can be thought of as, in fact, the first banks (see Heliodorus).  
Though the judicial process of today has changed significantly, many practices of the 
original Kings’ Courts are thriving in contemporary civil and criminal justice procedures. 
Especially in relation to prisoners of debt, the American judicial entity today like those 
expounded in Medieval Kings’ Courts documents, plunges the poor into illiquidity by 
excessively imposing monetary sanctions as extensions of punishment. Such systems justify 
and exacerbate social dislocation on the basis of law and justice: By punishing the poor for 
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being poor, the entrapment of social debt for the imprisoned poor is illustrated. Debt 
entrapment becomes solidified by systems of monetary justice. 
The Rise of Prisons and Colonial Debt Bondsmen: The Punishment Institution 
 The history of debt bondsmen is long and complicated to grasp, so focusing on 
European servitude in the New World colonies for clarity is relevant here. Usury was 
important in the development of debt prisoners. Simon Sturtevant (1570-1624) was a legal 
debtor under the English “surety law”. Not able to maintain a steady line of credit, Sturtevant 
was imprisoned at the “Kings’ bench for Suertiship and debt” (Sherman, 2009; pp. 242). A 
series of essays soon were written for punishment reform by debzzt prisoners. Thomas 
Dekker was essential to these reform measures because he, like his fellow reformers Geffray 
Minshull (jailed for gambling debts) and William Fennor, were consistently funneling 
through the Kings’ Bench because they were entrapped by debt (Ibid; pp. 253). It was this 
reason that Christendom in the Far West opposed interest-bearing loans. St. Basil sermon at 
Cappadocia in 365 A.D. saw “usury…as an attack on Christen charity, on Jesus’s injunction 
to treat the poor as they would treat the Christ himself, giving without expectation of 
return…” (Graeber, 2011; pp. 283). Although St. Basil focused on the usage of usury in the 
early era of Christendom, such negative connotations have done little to deter the State from 
imposing vicious cycles of debt on to the poor.    
With private enclosure movements in late fifteenth to mid seventeenth century 
England, punishing the poor became institutionalized in English workhouses and early jails 
and prisons. Karl Polanyi (1944) notes that the enclosure movement was “a revolution of the 
rich against the poor” by which the property-less poor were transformed into “beggars and 
thieves” (Ibid; pp. 37). Through employing the serfs as tenant farmers, merchant farmers and 
“wealthy countrymen” created the first instance of a mass sharecropping system consisting of 
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poor Europeans as tenants and the well-to-do property owners as the masters of their labor. 
Pro-enclosure advocates obviously benefitted from property laws so they came to replace the 
order of Kingdoms by replacing the monarch with constitutional gentries (Ibid; pp. 38). 
Resulting from private enclosures was the increased reliance on criminal justice proceedings 
and prison buildings for punishing the property-less classes. Shortly after prisons and jails 
construction, the poor prisoner was turned into a source of involuntary servile labor.  
‘Defense of Society’ is one of the major public works programs Adam Smith (1776) 
advocated for in Wealth of Nations. For Smith the function of public works is to keep free 
markets and perfect competition engrained as the defining feature of capitalism, relative to 
‘Defense of Society’ programs in today’s America— considering criminal and civil justice 
systems only— quite the opposite is happening. Criminal justice systems prohibit perfect 
competition between those with capital assets (both financial and physical) and those without 
it. This disrupts the prospects of utility maximizing behavior and the subsequent capital 
accumulation of the former class. It validates hypothetical models based on rational behavior 
and free agency of the ‘economic man’ (homo-economicus); there is persistent divergence in 
America’s social hierarchy and the justice system has played a primary role it. It is the 
instructor of the lives of many indigent folk that fight to rid themselves of exorbitant 
monetary sanctions forced upon them for petty crimes. Crime and poverty made one eligible 
for forced labor and imprisonment in the early punishment industry in Colonial America.     
 
                         Servitude v. Punitive Punishment in Colonial America: 
Indentured servitude in Colonial America led to radical growth in the white European 
population. The Virginia Company was directly involved in the transportation of indentured 
servants to British colonies.  Most individuals that entered into servile contracts did so 
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conditionally usually under terms that he would be manumitted. But many schemes came 
forward, designing a system to isolate those suffering from the forces of private enclosures. 
Like the English apprenticeship traditions, vagabonds and vagrant children in the American 
colonies were sold into servitude until they reached twenty-one years of age (Newman, 2015; 
pp. 65). On the other hand, “the ill-stared date of 1619” marked the beginning of women 
trafficking to the New World. Sir Edwin Sandy of the Virginia Company then created a 
market for marriage in order to populate the New World colonies (Price, 2015; pp. 77). 
Marriage as a socialized contract represented women’s indefinite status as an indebted wife 
to the husband she was sold to. The laws of the land were not robust; the lawful process of 
divorcing their husbands rarely manumitted women sold into marital contracts.  
 Servile laborers were directly transported to the colonies as State debtors contrasted 
to the plantations where European convicts, rogues and vagabonds, and political prisoners 
were sold (Smith, 1947; pp. 20). By 1622, King James I had made it lawful to transport 
felons to the colonies as a method to mobilize the poor prisoner from the chains of 
punishment in England. Punitive confinement was ever expanding under King James I 
included church officials as prospective prison subjects: The “System of the Law” called “to 
abolish benefit of clergy and replace it with a term in the workhouse at hard labor” (Hirsch, 
1992; pp. 17).  
 Workhouse labor morphed into plantation labor for felons seeking pardon to the 
colonies and West Indies. Many indentured servants and felons were auctioned next to 
African slaves as a way to supply a mixed and relatively proportionate demographic. A wide 
array of marketing systems emerged to force white laborers into the colonies as a method of 
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maintaining the New World population. For example, for those individuals seeking shelter in 
the New World that were impoverished: 
 
[M]erchants used to take whatever money the emigrant might have left, put him and 
his goods and his family aboard ship, and contract to deliver them in 
America…commonly fourteen days was allowed during which the passenger might 
try to find the balance which was due to the shipper…. But if the necessary amount 
could not be found…he was to be sold into indentured servitude by the captain of 
the ship, for an amount sufficient to satisfy his indebtedness (Smith; pp. 20-21). 
 
This depicts the reality of contractual debt obligations in colonial America. However, 
prior to the American Revolution the colonies acted as the asylum for criminals exiled from 
England as well (Barnes, 1921; pp. 37: Hirsch, 1992: Newman, 2015: Hay, 1980: Price, 
2015). Abbot Smith (1947) added that the surcharge to transport a convict to the States was 
on average thirty-one shillings (Ibid; pp. 99). Merchants were charged with this burden for 
they were directly invested in privatized markets specializing in servile labor transport— 
African slaves, white indentured Europeans, felon criminals, and the vagrant children forced 
into apprenticeship. By the early eighteenth century when many convicts started to be 
transported to the colonies under the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act, the criminal population in the 
British colonies increased significantly. The act made it illegal to exile members of the 
citizenry from the British English territory unless a felon wanted to be pardoned under the 
condition of exiling himself to the British colonies (Smith, 1947; pp. 91). They were 
property-less, criminals, and undesirables indebted to the law of the land and because of this 
rehabilitation through the process of laboring was rational. Their ability to labor was their 
social value and thus the State could not allow those able-bodies to go to waste.   
      
Birth of Penal Institutions: 
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Harry Barnes (1921) and Adam J. Hirsch (1992) constructed the progression of 
criminal confinement by connecting it to traditional workhouse facilities. Early English 
workhouses were filled with impoverished individuals because of the draconian-like 
vagrancy and anti-idle laws. Under Queen Elizabeth’s Vagrancy Act of 1547 and the Statute 
of Artificers in 1563, vagrants and criminals were confined in workhouses as a method of 
State sanctioned rehabilitation infused with forced labor. It was an act used to bound 
vagabonds, debtors, and the unproductive vagrants to masters who could lawfully coerce 
them to work (Newman, 2015; pp. 65). The “System of the Law” was quickly followed by 
the colonies. It constructed its own methods of forced labor practices and punitive justice. 
However, Puritan and Quaker codes of criminal and civil justice were progressive for its time 
considering capital punishment and public humiliation was the default options of punishing 
the impoverished vagrants and thieves. The Quakers of West Jersey and Pennsylvania, along 
with Connecticut’s adoption of ‘Blue Laws’ in 1642 and 1650, and New York’s “Dukes of 
York Laws” in 1665 rationalized punitive reformation in tandem to punishing the poor— 
they fought to lower the amount of capital punishments by way of enforcing labor 
rehabilitation in workhouses (Barnes, 1921; pp. 38).  
There were two distinct forms of criminal justice institutions in the British colonies: 
Jails and prisons, where criminal patients awaiting trial, criminal debtors, and religious and 
political figures were confined; and the workhouse where people were typically housed for 
rehabilitation through the process of forced labor. The ‘Gaol delivery’ period insinuated the 
horrendous sightings of individuals confronted by death or State sanctioned brutality because 
the verdict for convicted defendants forced through the Gaol system typically resulted in 
capital punishment (Barnes, 1921; pp. 36: Hay, 1980; pp. 49: Mann, 1994). Both systems 
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encouraged punitive justice for those members of society deemed idle and unproductive. The 
revolt of the property owning class against the property-less indigents often times saw 
idleness as a sin: One punishable by forced labor in workhouses and on plantations or 
publicized punishment— for example, floggings, hangings, stockings, duck stooling etc. 
More importantly, “The penitentiary epitomized order…[which] has been explained as a 
partial expression of problems of capitalist labor supply” (Hay, 1980; pp. 55-56: also view 
Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1968). Thus punitive institutions functioned methodologically as 
means of civilizing and ordering the poor according to what law philosophers and litigants 
saw as social justice.  
Enlightenment rationalists focused on social justice in the realm of labor because they 
thought it irrational to let the productive capacities of the prisoner escape the State. For this 
reason, rationalists William Eden, John Howard, and Justice William Blackstone devised the 
English Penitentiary Act of 1779, which fabricated the architecture of penitentiaries we see 
today. Quickly following, Massachusetts’s 1785 legislative inflicted hard labor for property 
crimes; New York in the 1780s used incarceration as opposed to corporal punishment for 
almost all crimes “just days after the Castle Island Act called for hard labor in the existing 
workhouse” (Hirsch, 1992; pp. 25). New York’s workhouse at the time— Walnut Street 
workhouse— was converted into an “indoor” punitive facility. With the introduction of New 
York’s Auburn Prison in 1818, the maximum security became the architectural prototype for 
derivative public prisons in every colony. Designed with cellblocks, solitary confinement 
rooms, guards’ watchtowers, and concrete enclosure from the world, prison facilities 
illustrated a Victorian-like punishment institution.  
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Legal Debtors in Colonial Prison: 
Debtors’ prisons were quite unique. In colonial Virginia between 1644 and 1645, an 
act was coined that allowed for:  
 
[A] provision for poor debtors in execution for corn, tobacco, etc. (then and long the 
after the principal currency of the colony) might satisfy the demand at the discretion 
of the county commissioners by some equitable commutation, was, in 1705, 
matured into an act permitting a debtor, after he had lain three months in prison, to 
discharge himself by surrendering his whole estate for the payment of the debt.  
               
– F.H. 1927; pp. 4 
 
Debtor prisoners were ubiquitous in all colonies and they typically consisted of individuals 
like London’s own WP who in 1708 was confined to the Old Bailey Prison for having an 
outstanding debt of £3000. WP owed the Fords this amount in rent payment, which he sold 
his Warminghurst Place in Sussex to make due on the payments: “He entered prison in 1708 
as a martyr to his ungrateful steward's cupidity” (Holar, Hirsch et al., 1987; pp. 569). By the 
late eighteenth century Massachusetts enacted laws that allowed convicted people of theft, 
larceny, and other property crimes to be sold to private plantation owners as a method to 
make restitution payments to the victims and to gain revenue (Hirsch, 1992; pp. 37). At this 
point there was a market that was developing for convicts prior to convict leasing post-
American Civil War. The prolific debtors’ prison in New York, New Gaol was constructed in 
1757-1758 for the purpose of housing “debtors as well as a few convicted misdemeanants 
and accused criminals awaiting trial” (Mann, 1994; pp. 183). Escaping the chains of debt was 
hard considering that most individuals compiled debt on debt in order to be released from 
punitive chains. As a result, most prisoners of debt like Simon Sturtevant and WP found their 
way into public jails and prisons working to produce material wealth for the State. This was 
their way of paying for or laboring off debts. It was with social reformations in the nineteenth 
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century that the United States sought to abolish debt peonage for white European criminals 
while accepting it in the case of freedmen.  
 
Southern Reconstruction: Bank Debt and the Development of Black Peonage  
Reconstruction (1863-1877) can be labeled as the start of mass incarcerating black 
bodies for convict leasing purposes. Due to section one of the Thirteenth Amendment which 
states— “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party had been duly convicted, shall exists within the United States”— a new 
form of forced servitude was justified (Wolff, 2002: Davis, 2003: Huq, 2001: Jarvis, 2004; 
pp. 92: Harris, pp. 19: Adamson, 1983; pp. 558: Manos, 2015; pp. 49). The Southern 
agriculture economy was destroyed in the Civil War along with the lives of many white 
Confederate soldiers. Shortage of white free labor was offset by the estimated four million 
freedmen (Du Bois, 1910; pp. 781) in the South prompting a tragic response among 
Democratic “Redeemers” to restore the status quo of forced labor practices along racial lines.  
Rutherford B. Hayes’s call for the restoration of Southern “Home Rule” basically 
restored freedmen’s position as labor capital upon Union troops departure from Southern soil 
in 1877 (Massey, 2011; Adamson, 1983). Christopher Adamson thinks it was the “fiscal 
insolvency” in the post-bellum South that created the means by which Democrats lawfully 
criminalized blackness when stating, “Redeemers promoted leasing as the ideal policy for 
handling the black criminal population…the decision to lease convicts to companies in the 
private sector was adopted during Reconstruction…in the 1870s and 1880s after the 
Democrats returned to power” (Ibid; pp. 564). Outstanding debt in South Carolina between 
1869 and 1874, as evaluated by Du Bois (1910) and other “Negro legislators” belonging to 
the Freedmen’s Bureau, was “millions of fraudulent bonds charged against the credit of the 
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State” in which an Act was implemented to “stamp six million bonds, denominated as 
conversion bonds, “fraudulent”’ (Ibid; pp. 793).  
Two researchers, Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch (1972), on the banking systems in 
the post Civil War Southern States confirmed that banking resources in the Southern states 
had diminished greatly. Banks were not diminutive in the antebellum South. At the start of 
the Civil War “average capital per bank in the South was reported as $463,000, compared to 
a nationwide average of about $270,000…” (Ibid; pp. 643). Nonetheless, most financial 
capital disappeared in the South post-Civil War until the creation of the 1863 National 
Banking Act. Yet financial institutions in the South remained smaller than its antebellum 
levels. Interestingly enough, they emphasized that illiteracy rates in the South made it quite 
difficult to introduce the new banking system that depended on large sums of direct deposits. 
Illiteracy rates had sored once the black population in the South was considered in census 
reports: Illiteracy rates of blacks ranged from 75 to 80 percent between the 1870s and 1880s 
(Daniel, 1979; pp. 95). Thus it was much more difficult for the South to financially rebuild 
without the help of the National Banking Act and merchant creditors in the North. William 
Brown and Morgan Reynolds (1973) reexamined Ransom and Sutch’s work on financial 
capital during Southern Reconstruction to find that there was a pretty stable stream of 
liquidity going into Southern industries.  
Unlike Ransom and Sutch (1972), Brown and Reynolds (1973) assert that commercial 
banks in the South were able to extend adequate credit to small-scale farmers (Ibid; pp. 865). 
Merchant creditors (or carpetbaggers) in North quickly infiltrated Southern agriculture 
markets by providing indebted farmers with a line of credit at extremely high interest rates. 
The North Carolina Department of Labor Statistics, Brown and Reynolds confirms, found 
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that most farmers in the state were angry about high fertilizer prices, high interest rates, and 
the subsequent debts that followed credit loans. Soon enough though, the landlord farmer and 
the merchant creditor merged as one individual with complete control over the black tenants 
in the South awaiting their ‘forty acres and a mule’. 
 Thought of as maintaining laissez faire capitalism, the Peonage cases United States v. 
Reynolds (1878) and Baily v. Alabama (1911) were designed to dismiss privately run 
“involuntary servitude” as a just practice in Southern Reconstruction while justifying it as a 
tool of punishment for State criminals (Huq, 2001). Peonage was developed along the lines 
of race and poverty. Even for those blacks that had large plots of land, financial debt still 
haunted them. Du Bois (1994) gave an anecdote of a black family, the Burkes, that possessed 
“a hundred acres, but they were still in debt” (Ibid; pp. 44). This was the reality of blacks 
manipulated by the sharecropping system in the South: Sharecropping bounded freedmen to 
Southern farmers in a way very similar to that of master-slave relations in the antebellum 
epoch. Freed blacks were subject to financial abuse because they were financially illiterate: 
 
black tenant farmers or sharecroppers were tied to white landowners or commercial 
establishments through usurious debt. The farmer would mortgage his crop in 
advance to a lender to get the money to buy the seed, farm tools, and equipment, as 
well as food for subsistence…When the crop was harvested, the lender would seize 
and sell it and keep what the farmer owed for formerly advanced retailed goods 
from the proceeds…  
                
                – Martinot, 2010; pp. 68 
 
There was more of an advantage in sharecropping because freedmen did not have 
entitlements to wage contracts. The reason being is that most blacks that could not find 
contractual labor pursued secure housing and labor by way of entering into sharecropping 
services. They were forced to purchase provisions, mostly on credit because they had little 
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wage income, so black peons “were bound in debt from year to year…coerced to work out 
with they owed” (Daniel, 1979; pp. 89: Adamson, 1983; pp. 559). Florida’s Turpentine 
Association violated countless peonage laws by forcing laborers, especially the financially 
illiterate freedmen, “to buy their supplies from the camp commissaries” in which often times 
black wage-laborers were “enslaved for as many as twenty years” because his “debt at the 
store exceeded his ability to pay” (Carper, 1976; pp. 89). They could possess property as 
American citizens but their position as freedmen was confined, for they were indebted to the 
very plantation owners that they were freed from with their mass manumission in 1863. The 
reason being is that peonage laws— “a form of involuntary servitude based on alleged debt 
or indebtedness” (Carper, 1976; pp. 85)— were lawfully ordained in the Northern and 
Southern states’ justice systems to force the property-less, illiterate, and desperate freedmen 
and freedwomen back to servile debtors.  
Black Codes in the South came to replace Slave Codes as the primary means by 
which criminal behavior of blacks was determined and punished by the State (Davis, 2003; 
pp. 31: Harris, 2016; pp. 157). For the most flimsy reasons freedmen were forced into servile 
status. For instance, the 1865 Florida Black Codes justified locking up freedmen who did not 
pay “special taxes” like the Freedman’s Pauper Funds (Price, 2015; pp. 84: Carper, 1976; pp. 
86). It was not uncommon for apprenticeship-like laws to be advanced in Black Codes. 
Customary to apprenticeship laws in the United States was the notion that black children 
under the age of eighteen born to impoverished parents were to be sold into bondage. 
Adamson (1983) expressed that:  
 
In effect, the Black Codes brought back a form of the hiring-out system that had 
existed under slavery. Blacks without visible means of support were obliged by law 
to hire themselves out during the first 10 days of January. Those without labor 
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contracts or who broke their contracts were prosecuted as vagrants and sentenced to 
hard labor on local plantations. Blacks in South Carolina had to obtain special 
licenses for non-agricultural employment. Mississippi prevented freedmen from 
renting land. Local communities restricted the movement of the ex-slave population 
by requiring them to obtain travel passes (Ibid; pp. 559). 
 
          – [also see Novak, 1978; pp. 1: Stampp, 1965; pp. 80: Jarvis, 2004; pp. 93] 
           
The infamous 1547 English Vagrancy Act was modified by the states, in both the 
North and South, to incarcerate at hard labor poor freedmen in post-Southern Reconstruction. 
Black Codes and Peonage laws were articulated and accepted by the North and South for 
economic reasons in that the ‘unfree labor’ of leased convicts was needed to reconstruct 
Southern public goods such as public roads, railroads, and public buildings destroyed during 
the Civil War (Huq, 2001: Carper, 1976: Daniel, 1979: Wright, 1997: Wolff, 2002: 
Adamson, 1983: Lichtenstein, 1993). They acted to “utilize customs from the past and the 
freedmen's illiteracy, relying on contracts and northern sympathy with the work ethic, and 
mouthing laws and threats, southern planters shaped a labor system that preserved the larva 
of slavery in the evolution of freedom” (Daniel, 1979; pp. 92).  
Railroad development was the first ‘big business’ venture in the Americas that relied 
on a huge labor supply. Railroad industries were growing excessively by the mid 1800s. It is 
acknowledged that big railroad companies like Pennsylvania Railroad, Massachusetts 
Western Railroad company, and New York’s Central Railroad had capitalized between $17 
to $35 million by 1850 growing to over $140 million in capital net-worth with nearly 8000 
shareholders by 1890 (Duboff, 1989; pp. 44). Michael Perelman (2006) found that in 1838 
Massachusetts’s Western Railroad had 2,331 shareholders whereas in 1853 Pennsylvania 
Railroad had over 2,600 with Central Railroad a bit short of that with its 2,445 shareholders 
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(Ibid; pp. 66). With the growing demand for a cheap labor supply to off-set investment costs 
in fixed capital and free white labor, “State endorsement of railway bonds went “hand in 
glove” with state provision of forced labor…[which] made a significant contribution to the 
rise of coal-iron complex…” (Wright, 1997; pp. 457).  
Penitentiary demographics in the South show that criminal justice systems had 
interest in incarcerating black bodies starting in the 1880s: The commitment— increase 
revenue and suppress freedmen socio-economically and politically. Before the Civil War 
there was little need for large penitentiaries in the South, so it was with Reconstruction that 
Auburn-style prisons manifested to contain the ‘natural’ black criminal. Margaret Cahalan 
(1979) and Rosemary Gido (1989) understood the rise in incarceration rates after 1880 was 
largely due to victimless crimes, but they did not delve deeply into the fact that there was a 
demographic shift in those forced into punitive institutions. Black Codes, convict leasing, 
Peonage laws, and economic turmoil in the late 1800s molded an atmosphere that depended 
on unfree labor of black convict chain gangs. Resulting from this fact, the incarceration rate 
increased from about 29.1 adults per 100,000 in 1850 to 115.2 per 100,000 by 1880 
(Cahalan, 1979; pp. 10). In most Southern states convicts leased were upwards of ninety 
percent blacks (Wright, 1997; pp. 454: Jarvis, 2004; pp. 93). The People’s Advocate, a Negro 
journal in Atlanta, Georgia gathered data on Georgia’s prison population and noticed that 
nine-tenths (90%) of the prison population was black in the 1890s. Fredrick Douglass’s 
(1883) famous quote— “the general deposition in this country to impute crime to color”— 
still lives on. Since 1900, almost 500,000 new state laws were added to incarcerate 
individuals for victimless crimes (Cahalan, 1979; pp. 9). With these new laws, legal financial 
obligations (LFOs) came to represent the new form of monetary justice for minor criminal 
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acts against private parties and the State. In conclusion, blacks have been the targets of 
incarceration because of their poverty and race. They have been unduly convicted because 
their physicality equates to crime, resentment, and indebtedness in the eyes of many criminal 
justice operators. With the rise of Mass Incarceration commencing in the 1980s, the attack on 
impoverished blacks was at the forefront of criminal justice proceedings yet again. 
 
Connecting the Lines in the Contemporary 
 Context: Debt Criminality in America 
 
The present economic crisis has spurred jurisdictions throughout the United States 
to find creative ways to increase revenue and hold offenders accountable for their 
crimes. One way that jurisdictions have sought to achieve these goals is by shifting 
the cost of prosecutions, convictions, and supervision onto offenders. Increases in 
both the number and amount of court fees, fines, and surcharges have become 
standard practice in courthouses throughout the nation…[many states] attached 
mandatory fees and fines at conviction…  
 
      – Shookhoff, Constantino, and Elkin, 2011; pp. 62 
 
 Monetary sanctions have been in tune with Western justice systems as represented by 
early Anglo-Saxon ‘Kings’ Law’. A common practice of the judicial body was tax collection 
and distributing justice, which moved monetary resources from the hands of defendants to 
the State. “Jus” was a Middle English word that denoted taxation. The ideal system was to 
distribute funds for sufficient revenue to be gained to fund Kings’ courts and its operators— 
Missi (Kings’ mobile tax collectors), Counts, jurors, etc. But the entire citizenry in the 
Middle Age Kings’ Courts was subject to monetary sanctions according to their level of 
wealth: The “King’s need of money was the origin of our centralised system of justice to-
day, both civil and criminal” (Innes, 1932; pp. 26).  
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America’s more recent history of justice depicts indigent blacks as the prime target 
for monetary sanctions, however. A case and point: A free black man in late nineteenth 
century Mississippi was fined $5 for being a “tramp” later to be assessed for other costs 
equaling a total of $9.95 (Harris, 2016; pp. 18). Legal financial obligations (LFOs) are 
broadly recognized by law scholars examining Mass Incarceration and its effect on creating 
vicious cycles of debt amongst indigent defendants. Vera Institute of Justice, a non-profit 
legal entity founded in the 1960s, has been at the forefront of evaluating the role monetary 
sanctions play in excessively punishing the poor for their inability to pay criminal debt. On 
March 14, 2016 the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division convened a “diverse 
group of stakeholders…to discuss the assessment and enforcement of fines and fees in state 
and local courts” because it was obvious that “unlawful and harmful practices in certain 
jurisdictions throughout the country” was at play.  
Legal scholars note that such unlawful and harmful practices violate due process and 
the equal protection clauses defined in the 14th Amendment and section VI of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. The reason has to due with race and the fact that indigent black individuals 
streamlined into criminal justice systems for minor ‘draconian’ drug laws are typically 
labeled willful non-payers of outstanding court debts even though they do not possess means 
to make LFO payments (Harris, 2016: Alexander, 2010: Kilgore, 2015: Mathilde, Wool, and 
Henrichson, 2017: Shames, 2011: Bresnick, 1982). There is a lack of assessing defendants’ 
‘ability to pay’ when it comes to monetary justice in the United States. Similar to what 
Mitchell Innes founded in his research on wergeld justice in early English courts, monetary 
justice poses a two-tiered system in which the indigent defendants are punished for poverty 
whereas those with means to pay LFOs are alleviated from confinement. How did systems of 
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monetary justice come into existence and what are its connections to early systems of 
distributive justice, though? 
 
A Brief Look into Mass Incarceration: The Incarceration Nation  
  Race and class structures defined United States’ penal code since before Southern 
Reconstruction (1863-1877). By 1970, however, the introduction of Conservative 
‘colorblind’ politics paved way for ‘law and order’ dialogue to be of considerable public 
interest (Murakawa and Beckett, 2010; Smith et al., 2011; Alexander, 2010; 48: Kilgore, 
2015: Gilmore, 2000). Hardline political rhetoric about crime in the 60s and 70s led to public 
resentment of the urban black community. Soaring unemployment rates, socio-economic 
segregation, and a drug epidemic found its way in white suburban communities and urban 
districts alike (Alexander, 2010). What is more concerning is the fact that “get tough on 
crime” rhetoric emerged following Civil Rights Movements in the 1960s, a time that the 
United States was progressing on the grounds of racial equity, hence the term ‘Welfare 
State.’ By the 70s, popular opinion amongst American voters was to cut deficit spending on 
programs that generally aided the poor. Brian Snowden and Howard Vane (1997) correlated 
the downfall in Keynesianism and New Deal economics to the ‘Great Inflation’ in the 1970s: 
 
During the early 1970s there was a significant renaissance of the belief that a 
market economy is capable of achieving macroeconomic stability, providing that 
the visible hand of government is prevented from conducting misguided 
discretionary fiscal and monetary policies. In particular the ‘Great Inflation’ of the 
1970s provided increasing credibility and influence to those economists who had 
warned that Keynesian activism was both over-ambitious and, more importantly, 
predicated on theories that were fundamentally flawed.  
 
      – Snowden and Vane, 1997; pp. 219 
 
 
Government deficits were seen by Republicans and Neoclassical economists (Milton 
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Friedman’s “counter-revolution” against Orthodox Keynesian expansionary policy) as an 
economically insufficient way of spending to maintain rising living standards post-1970s 
Stagflation. General consensus among conservative laissez faire economists was that 
excessive government transfer payments caused high levels of unemployment and inflation 
simultaneously in the first place. The Phillip’s Curve was ruptured— as high inflation and 
high unemployment rates troubled the economic climate in the 70s— and sound finance 
legitimacy restored. In light of the ‘Great Inflation,’ progressive government programs 
(Welfare payments, Social Security, and Medicare and Medicaid) were uttered in Republican 
rhetoric to present the illusion to blue-collar workers that the government was shifting 
resources to impoverished black communities at the expensive of working class tax receipts 
(Alexander, 2010; pp. 47).  
Michelle Alexander’s text The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness constructed a critical analysis on the history of Jim Crow politics and its 
influence on Mass Incarceration. In regards to penal structures, Angela Davis asked the 
question: “Are prisons [and jails] racists institutions” (Davis, 2003; pp. 26)? “The Speech”— 
a term used to reference Ronald Reagan’s public campaign against Big Government in the 
1960’s. He argued that the “evils of communism” and the “threat of centralization” became 
synonymous to Big Government (Ritter, 1968). In a sense, “The Speech” emphasized a ‘tax 
revolt’ against expansionary fiscal policy shown in the robust New Deal economic era 
(1940s-1970s). The Republican new majority sprouted in the light of the concerned Southern 
white electorate. What homogenized this new majority was their worry “that poverty was 
caused not by structural factors related to race and class but rather by culture— particularly 
black culture…The “social pathologies” of the poor, particularly street crime, illegal drug 
	90		
use, and delinquency, were redefined by conservatives as having their cause in overly 
generous relief arrangements. Black “welfare cheats” and their dangerous offspring 
emerged…” (Alexander, 2010; pp. 45). The covert assumption by quasi-race neutral 
politicians and their “new silent majority” in the South was that the ‘black soul’ is 
predisposed to self-crippling behavior (Bobo and Smith, 1998). 
Mass Incarceration was a trending process in American history as shown by the 
works of Margaret Cahalan (1979) and Rosemary Gido (1989). The process was so tolerant 
that today— America has approximately five percent of the world’s population yet houses 
twenty-five percent of the world’s incarcerated peoples (Pew Research Center on the States: 
Behind Bars in America, 2008; pp. 5: Pigeon and Wray, 2000). The mentally ill are not 
exempt from carceral expansion. A New York Times article released in 1998 cited that 10% 
of the incarcerated population suffered from the top three severe mental illnesses— 
schizophrenia, manic depression, or major depression (Pigeon and Wray, 2000; pp. 154). 
Instead of housing the mentally ill in facilities that fit their every day needs, the State has 
sought to defund mental health facilities in place of extending funds to punishment 
institutions that worsen the conditions of mentally impaired persons.  
Bruce Western and Becky Pettit (2010) noted that, “From 1980 to 2008, the U.S. 
incarceration rate climbed from 221 to 762 per 100,000. In the previous five decades, from 
the 1920s through the mid 1970s, the scale of punishment in America had been stable at 
around 100 per 100,000” (Ibid; pp. 10). Angela Davis’s (2003) text— “Are Prisons 
Obsolete?”— found a stark contrast in the sum total of black to white incarcerated people: 
“A total of 803,400 black inmates— 118,600 more than the total number of white inmates” 
(Ibid; pp. 20). Gilmore (2015) expanded on Davis’s work finding that “In 2012 incarceration 
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rates for blacks stood at 2,805 per 100,000” approximately six times higher than whites and 
three times higher than Hispanics. Federal and State expenditures on prisons and jails also 
inclined dramatically to fully complete the development of the ‘Incarceration Nation.’ 
Expenditures went from “$7 billion in 1980 to $57 billion in 2000 and have exceeded $70 
billion every year since 2007” (Ibid; pp. 12: Wacquant, 2010; pp. 76). ‘Colorblind’ 
politicians simultaneously defunded Welfare programs such as Section 8 Housing, TANF, 
food stamps, and other forms of subsidies to the urban poor while expanding the budgets for 
crime control agencies that found their way terrorizing the impoverished “hyper-ghettos” 
neglected by historic racialized institutions (Wacquant, Eick, and Winker, 2011). The urban 
black cohorts are now criminalized on an unmatched scale. Loïc Wacquant (2010) coined the 
term “hyper-incarceration” to be more of a fitting colloquial term for the current state of 
excessive criminal confinement, which the results cannot be exempt from the history of 
geographical redlining in the States since the 70s: 
 
 
Mass incarceration is a mischaracterization of what is better termed hyperincarceration. 
This is not a mere terminological quibble, for the change in wording points to a different 
depiction of the punitive turn, which leads to a different causal model and thence to 
different policy prescriptions. Mass incarceration suggests that confinement concerns large 
swaths of the citizenry (as with the mass media, mass culture, and mass unemployment), 
implying that the penal net has been flung far and wide across social and physical space… 
anything but broad and indiscriminate. They have been finely targeted, first by class, 
second by that disguised brand of ethnicity called race, and third by place. This cumulative 
targeting has led to the hyperincarceration of one particular category, lower-class African 
American men trapped in the crumbling ghetto, while leaving the rest of society - 
including, most remarkably, middle- and upper-class African Americans - practically 
untouched (Ibid; pp. 78). 
 
         
Imprisoning Blacks in the Age of Mass Incarceration: 
 Are prisons racist institutions? One may think so considering punitive institutions 
have been prone to confine blacks at alarming rates in proportion to their general population 
in America. ‘War on drugs,’ advocated first by former president Richard Nixon in his 1970 
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State of the Union Address, is extremely correlated to the incline in caging black bodies in 
jails and prisons. Since then African Americans moved to “constitute 13 percent of the 
American population and 14 percent of drug users, they make up 37 percent of Americans 
arrested for drugs and 56 percent of the people in state prisons for drug offenses” (Brown, 
2012; pp. 73: for more primary data see U.S. Congress, 2009). President Ronald Reagan, on 
the other hand, is titled paragon of the drug war with his 1984 Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
and his issuance of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act in 1988; it molded a bipartisan in support of 
tough on crime discourse. The bipartisan was expressed throughout the 1990s especially with 
Bill Clinton’s presidency. Clinton’s 1994 Omnibus Crime Bill provided states with financial 
incentives to unfairly detain the urban black cohort for the interception of federal subsidies 
(Brown, 2010: Alexander, 2010: Gottschalk, 2007). It also defunded education programs in 
prisons by prohibiting Pell Grants to be granted to patients seeking in-house secondary 
education.   
The State and its criminal justice operators incentivized the incarceration of 
impoverished blacks. There was no true ‘war on drugs’ because if there were, proportionally, 
whites would be detained at the same rate as the urban impoverished blacks for drug crimes. 
The history of racial injustice in this country has allowed for the attack on the urban poor to 
be acceptable relative to incarceration (Gilmore, 2000): The reason is many blacks believed 
that there needed to be more policing and crime control in their prospective communities 
during the years immediately following Civil Rights Movements. Crime rates were growing 
in the 1970s causing a general acceptance of ‘get tough on crime’ approaches to criminal 
justice reform in the United States.  
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Legal codes like the Rockefeller Drug Laws (1973), Aldolphus Belk’s Anti-Drug Act 
(1986), and California’s Three Strikes Law (1994) created mandatory minimum guidelines. 
Both Republicans and Democrats criminalized the urban poor for the realities capitalist 
modes of production shaped for them. Thence the creation of 100-to-1 ratios came into 
existence. It was expressed that the poor man’s drug— crack cocaine, which is a by-product 
of powder cocaine— caused more harm to the American society than the rich man’s drug 
(powder cocaine) did (Belk, 2006). By 1983, mandatory minimum sentences were in used in 
forty-three states. Out of those states that had mandatory minimums, twenty-nine required 
imprisonment for minor drug offenses (Bloomberg and Lucken, 2010). To punish defendants 
more, almost all minimum sentences had mandatory LFOs attached to them. 
Of considerable importance to laissez faire Conservatives— respective of carceral 
expansion— was the acceptance of private for-profit prison industries as an impartial 
extension of criminal justice. The Prison Industry Enhancement Act of 1979, as stimulated 
by laissez faire capitalists’ theories of rational and efficient economic markets, brought back 
traditions of forced labor practices in prisons as a form of maximizing the efficiency of State 
property through labor rehabilitation (Busher, 2013). Corrections Corporations of America 
(1984)— formatted in Texas by prison investors Tom Beasley, John Ferguson, and Don 
Hutto— and Wackenhut Corrections Corporations benefit directly from Mass Incarceration 
as profit seeking entities forming pacts with federal and state punitive facilities. The essence 
of their profit depends on chain gang labor productivity and leasing beds to district jails and 
state prisons that are overrun with patients.  
When speaking of the ‘prison-industrial-complex,’ these entities are key because they 
directly reflect the “corporatization of punishment” (Davis, 2003; pp. 37). CCA and 
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Wackenhut Corrections Corporations not only lease beds to state and federal prisoners as part 
of their corporate interest, they directly invested in mortgage-backed-securities prior to the 
2008 Housing Market Bubble (Mattera, Khan, and Nathan, 2003). Plainly put, since the 
1980s CCA and Wackenhut Corrections Corporation— like its colorblind political associates 
in Congress— deemed the punishment industry as a mechanism for working the poor. 
Nothing condenses the trade-off between private interest in carceral expansion and the 
decline in Welfare spending than Angela Davis and Cassandra Shaylor’s (2001) work on 
“Race, Gender, and The Prison Industrial Complex”: 
 
Globalization of capitalism has precipitated the decline of the welfare state in industrialized 
countries, such as the U.S. and Britain, and has brought about structural adjustment in the 
countries of the southern region. As social programs in the U.S. have been drastically 
curtailed, imprisonment has simultaneously become the most self-evident response to many 
of the social problems previously addressed by institutions such as Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC). In other words, in the era of the disestablishment of social 
programs that have historically served poor communities, and at a time when affirmative 
action programs are being dismantled and resources for education and health are declining, 
imprisonment functions as the default solution (Ibid; pp. 2). 
 
 There is a growing concern about the historical development of racialized punishment 
in the United States in the nexus of incarceration. It has become obvious in the eyes of the 
masses that our criminal justice system is unjust and biased. As known from history, 
imprisonment has always been inflicted on the poor as rational means of social justice. Debt-
based justice, too, is expressed in the historical material development of the Incarceration 
Nation— as it had importance in the evolution of Graeco-Roman social justice customs. 
Before presenting New Orleans as a case study for debt-based justice in contemporary light, 
it is logical to begin with a general overview of monetary justice significance in the Mass 
Incarceration movement.  
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Modern Day Debt Prisoners: LFOs as Justice 
One of the most pressing issues in America’s criminal justice framework today is the 
unfair and unjust attack on urban poor communities through monetary justice. It is a 
multifaceted way of extending punishment beyond the realm of prison and jail walls. What is 
the make-up of monetary sanctions in American criminal justice systems? Lets start by 
defining types of LFOs: 1) Broadly speaking fines are punitive payments in money because 
they are usually attached to ones’ punishment; 2) Fees are itemized payments used to fund 
criminal justice operations, surcharges are also generally included in fee payments; 3) Lastly, 
bails are bond payments intended to release less risky defendants from confinement until 
their arraignment date. Interest rates are typically included in bails bonds since bond credits 
generally come from private for-profit entities partnering with criminal justice operators 
(Harris, 2016: Council of Economic Advisers Issue Brief, 2015). Arizona, for example, 
levies an eighty-three percent surcharge on all its fines. Resulting from this monetary 
penalty, traffic violators that receive a financial penalty of $500 end up paying $915 
(Kilgore, 2015; pp. 110). Many state prisons and local jail operations apply user-pay fines, 
fees, and bonds to express the notion that defendants who use the criminal justice system 
should directly pay for it. This sort of laissez faire approach to criminal justice has sparked 
controversy because scheduled payments are usually fixed in statutory law forcing most 
judges to impose LFOs even though the defendants are indigent and cannot possibly make 
criminal liability payments. It is a feature that distinguishes wergeld-like justice systems 
from America’s distributive justice framework. 
 Every state uses some form of LFOs as a manner of deterring crime but most indigent 
defendants find themselves back on the streets they were scooped from seeking ways to pay 
monetary sanctions. The level of “indebtedness contributes to the accumulation of 
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disadvantage in three ways: by reducing family income; by limiting access to opportunities 
and resources such as housing, credit, transportation, and employment; and by increasing the 
likelihood of ongoing criminal justice involvement was established” (Harris, Evans, and 
Beckett, 2010: pp. 1756). The adjudications in Williams v. Illinois (1970), Tate v. Short 
(1971), and Bearden v. Georgia (1983) that the “willful” nonpayment and the efforts to make 
LFO payments in state law and in courthouses determine “the status of nonpaying defendants 
and whether or not they can be sentenced to incarceration” (Harris, 2016; pp. 22).  Many 
state statutes define willful nonpayers to be those that act in contempt of the court by failing 
to make legal debt payments when they are employed laborers or receive State-issued 
benefits (Ibid; pp. 120). The problem with this is indigent individuals are forced to give up 
their means of subsistence provided by the State to pay State imposed obligations thus 
perpetuating their dependence on federal subsidies. The financial burden caused by 
‘punishment continuums’ or LFOs depress State and federal budgets by forcing indigent 
defendants to pay mandatory sanctions without providing them with necessary rehabilitative 
tools to mobilize out of legal debt. Over sixty percent of black patients detained report having 
an annual income of less than $12,000 (Rabuy and Kopf, 2016), so they depend on Welfare 
programs for their day-to-day survival. Nonetheless, Bill Clinton’s 1994 Omnibus Crime Bill 
sought to punish the “welfare queens” and the “super-predators” by taking TANF and Food 
Stamps away from felons convicted. Increasing the amount of felony crimes by employing 
most scheduled drugs during the ‘war on drugs’ as just means to issue felony convictions. 
The war on the poor persists. 
 Since the 90s, LFOs have found their way plaguing criminal law reform efforts in 
state and county jails punishing “suspected criminals and tortfeasors to bear the costs of 
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defending their actions…leads to justice on the basis of ability to pay— to rationed justice, in 
other words” (Bresnick, 1982; pp. 35). Over twenty-five percent of patients (referring to 
‘inmates’ as patients is a method of ridding negative connotations associated with ‘inmates’ 
degrading subtext) alleged that they received LFOs in 1991; by the early 2000s that number 
had jumped to over fifty percent (Harris, Evans, and Beckett, 2010; Harris, 2016). Alexes 
Harris (2016) attributes: 
  
States also levy penalties for financing in the event that defendants cannot pay their 
monetary sanctions on time and in full. More than half of states have statutes that 
allow additional costs related to late payments, incomplete payments, or 
nonpayment. Fees are charged to establish payment plans and make payments for 
late fees; annual collection fees, surcharges, and interest are also levied. Florida 
charges 4.75 percent interest on uncollected legal debt, Georgia charges 7 percent, 
and Washington charges 12 percent. States can find defendants delinquent on their 
payments and impose additional penalties for nonpayment. Illinois allows judges to 
assess a 15 percent penalty on unpaid LFOs in addition to a 30 percent collection 
fee. Arizona charges a $35 fee and a 19 percent collection fee for delinquent 
payments on monetary sanctions (Ibid; pp. 42). 
 
Admitted to North Carolina’s criminal laws in the 90s was the attachment of a 
“general court fee” of $95.50 and a “facilities fee” of $30 to every user of the criminal justice 
system, Louisiana has a $300 fee that goes into the “judicial expense fund,” and Washington 
state imposes a $100 DNA sampling fee even though most individuals involved are 
impoverished and cannot make due on these mandatory payments (Kilgore, 2015; pp. 110). 
Alabama assesses a thirty percent collection fee for servicing the process of extracting LFOs 
from defendants. And, Florida allows the private debt collectors to impose a forty percent 
surcharge to the underlying debt being assessed (Alexander, 2010; pp. 155). Indefinite debt is 
a reality for many indigent offenders receiving LFOs. Financial attacks through criminal 
proceedings generate a continuation of punishing underprivileged peoples. The lack of a day 
fines and day fees system— which are calculative models that assess and impose monetary 
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sanctions in comparison to the financial assets withheld upon their court date (Hillsman, 
1990; pp. 54)— makes it difficult task for criminal justice reformers to implement a robust 
system of accounting legal debt corresponding to indigency assessments.  
Money is synonymous to justice and has been for quite some time now. It is 
disturbing how LFOs have inclined to be the most utilized instrument for extracting criminal 
justice revenue from the pockets of poor defendants. Vera Institute researchers suggest that 
over eighty percent of individuals whom receive fines and fees— an over whelming majority 
of LFO revenue is generated via misdemeanor cases and traffic fines— are poor and receive 
some form of Welfare subsistence from the State (Shookhoff, Constantino, and Elkin, 2011; 
pp. 63). New Orleans, LA has its significance for it is the de facto ‘Incarceration Capital’ of 
the world which LFOs has its importance in its broad expansion of confinement. 
   
                           New Orleans’s Debt Prisoners: 
 In Louisiana’s Rules of Court (2008) it is stated that local courts should “develop, 
promulgate, and maintain a problem-solution process” that “resolve complaints regarding a 
lack of access [to justice]”. The call for fair judicial practices was announced post Katrina 
because the Crescent City, New Orleans, LA, incarcerated its population at nearly five times 
the national average. In 1980 the city housed just over 2,300 patients in its local jail, Orleans 
Parish Prison (OPP), progressing to add over 6,300 patients in 2005 (Johnson, Lasine, and 
Wool, 2007). The Vera team in New Orleans identified that most people housed in OPP were 
detained there pre-trial because they could not afford bail bonds. In fact, bail bonds typically 
forced detainees into privately issued credit-debt relations. On average housing patients costs 
the city about $106 a day per inmate in tax revenues (Lasine, Henrichson, and Wool, 2017). 
To cope with the financial burden of maintaining excessive incarceration, OPP and the New 
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Orleans Municipal Courts shifted its focus to monetary or distributive justice. Recently 
released, a Vera Institute project titled “Past Due: Examining the Costs and Consequences of 
Charging Justice in New Orleans” explains debt entrapment using two case studies involving 
native New Orleanians:  
 
When Veronica was arrested and detained, her mother risked losing her house to 
raise the $2,500 to purchase a bail bond and pay associated government fees. It’s 
money she’ll never get back, but it was the only way to get her daughter out of jail 
after she had already spent 10 days behind bars. Keith, who is 61, still struggles to 
pay off thousands of dollars in court costs and restitution as a result of writing a bad 
check in 2014. He is making monthly payments that at times have deprived his 
family of basic necessities, including running water, and have strained his marriage 
almost to the breaking point (Ibid; pp. 1). 
 
Over eighty percent, according to Vera Sources, of those detained in OPP are poor 
African Americans that cannot afford pre-trial bail (Johnson, Lasine, and Wool, 2007). To 
further penalize poverty, an extra three percent fee is included on bond premiums to “pass on 
to government” (Ibid; pp. 6). It becomes relevant to note that over ninety percent of pretrial 
detainees in OPP are indigent blacks who, spend fifty percent more time in jail prior to their 
arraignment date than their detained white counterparts (Wool, 2011; pp. 13). An unbiased 
justice system is fundamental to America’s criminal code as defined in the Sixth 
Amendment, but a common custom in New Orleans’s jurisprudence practice is geared 
around forging financial penalties for indigent defendants that depended on public defenders. 
Relying on the constitutional cases Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) and Argersinger v. Hamlin 
(1972), Louisiana’s case State v. Citizens (2004) held that the state legislature was to 
implement a budget forum for its public defenders: The Public Defender Act was created in 
2007 with this end goal in mind.  
 Cain et al v. City of New Orleans et al (2015) was a case that focused on the 
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unconstitutionality of imposing monetary sanctions on indigent defendants without assessing 
their poverty. Judges in criminal courts use private collections agencies to accumulate and 
disperse excess revenues to criminal justice operators: Likewise, collection agents have 
discretion in imposing financial penalties while also acquiring the right to issue warrants for 
those who cannot make monthly payments. Cain and other plaintiffs argued that the method 
and purpose of collecting LFOs in New Orleans was aimed at profits and not justice for 
“Criminal District Court judges collect 1.8% of each bond, while the Orleans Parish District 
Attorney’s office, the Orleans Public Defenders’ office, and the Orleans Parish Sheriff each 
collect 0.4% of each bond” (Ibid; pp. 5). Like Kings’ Courts defined in early traditions of 
social justice, debt criminality is a social reality for many poor. In context of America’s 
traditions of distributive justice, its history with racial institutions calls attention to the 
question asked by Angela Davis— “Are prisons [and jails] racist institutions?” New 
Orleans’s rich history and culture is tied to its brutal past. With slave harboring, convict 
leasing, and now Mass Incarceration, the Crescent City mirrors the lifetime entrapment of 
debt America has imposed disproportionally on indigent blacks.  
The need for adequate judicial revenue sources engulfs the punishment continuum. 
By shipping indigent black males, although black women have been amongst the fastest 
growing incarcerated cohort in the past decade (Swavola, Riley, and Subramanian, 2016), to 
prisons and jails for debt, legal debtors pressure themselves to find means of payment for 
their criminal LFOs. Incarceration for poverty has no temporal or moral boundaries. 
Punishment reform efforts have historically been in liking of excessively punishing the poor 
in less harsher methods than the preceding standards of distributing justice it supersedes. 
Money is thus hyper-fetishized by indigent defendants facing LFOs in New Orleans because 
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it is their means of freedom. Nonetheless, for defendants resorting to financial credit to make 
obligatory payments— they further trap themselves in a vicious cycle of debt in an attempt to 
escape criminal LFOs. The problem with this is private credit unions and collections agencies 
act as an extension of the judicial system. They, too, prey on the financially illiterate 
indigents by streamlining interest bearing bails bonds as a pseudo-external force to criminal 
justice systems. Indeed it costs a lot to be a poor man in America; it costs even more to be a 
poor black defendant undergoing cycles of criminal justice debt.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concluding Remarks and Sound Approaches to 
            Distributive Justice: 
  
 Distributive justice institutions are an overwhelming force in human history. Crime 
and debt imposed on the poor provokes the consciousness of the masses to recognize the 
realities formulated by distributive justice frameworks. Vera Institute of Justice project 
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“Reimagining Prisons”— launched at Pennsylvania’s Eastern State Penitentiary on June 20, 
2016— seeks to stipulate prison and jail reform through the notion of restoring patients (I 
refer to ‘inmates’ as patients methodologically to rid negative connotations associated with 
‘inmates’ and to offer a term that is linguistically suitable for people housed in State 
rehabilitative and restorative facilities). But what are the robust ways to restoration and how 
could the State direct its current judicial system to fit the needs of poor prisoners? Evidence 
out there shows strong association between poverty and imprisonment, therefore there is no 
way to restore and rehabilitate patients without taking heed to economic forces that 
perpetuate cycles of poverty. 
 One huge reason that recidivism rates are much higher in the United States than in 
any other nation has a lot to do with its criminal justice systems operating as hostile entities 
towards those it confines under terms of rehabilitation. As opposed to rehabilitation and 
restoration, though, the United States justice departments are retributive shown by the 
excessive punishment it imposes on the poor. To move from a retributive punishment 
framework to one of actual rehabilitation and restoration, there is importance in 1) State— 
federal and local—mandated labor programs for patients, 2) Re-entry programs for 
rehabilitation in and outside of prison and jail facilities, 3) Family and community service 
programs offered to neighborhoods suffering from cycles of poverty, imprisonment, and 
legal debt, and 4) Budget and tax reform at the federal and state level with particular 
emphasis on downsizing spending on criminal justice operations— court houses, law 
enforcement agencies, and corrections institutions— in place of financing public education, 
employment, housing, and consumption in at-risk communities. Hinging on budget and tax 
reform, distributing jobs and transfer payments to communities in plight generates broad base 
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‘effective demand’ because these communities spend most of their disposable income on 
consumer goods. The spending could create an economic hub for it will naturally boost job 
opportunities, state tax revenues, and the need to create demand deposit accounts. In this 
sense, at-risk communities would be better off if there was more investment in development 
projects, public employment, education, and consumption, which means there would be less 
revenue needed to keep up with corrections facilities and judicial operators. 
 Randall Wray and Marc-Andre Pigeon (2000) drew parallels between labor in 
‘military Keynesianism’—exemplified in the years leading up to and following WWII— and 
labor practices in the current state of ‘penal Keynesianism’ created by the bill HR 2558. Bill 
HR 2558 made prison labor an in-house rehabilitative tool. The argument for Wray, Pigeon, 
and many others, including myself, whom question the economically inefficient nature of 
criminal justice ultimately attest that ‘Public Service Employment’ (PSE) is a sound step to 
reforming patients. The federal government is important in the reform movement since it is 
the sovereign authority that wields the power as the monetary regime: Its major function is to 
provide state, local, and private non-profits with financial and physical resources to robustly 
run PSE programs (Ibid; pp. 156). At the criminal justice level, such a system would not 
work unless re-entry programs operate closely with families and communities to create a 
strong support system for newly released patients. Stressing secondary education especially, 
re-entry could add a great deal of social value to at-risk communities by providing skills and 
knowledge to incarcerated patients that improve their prospective job opportunities post-
release.  
 Through this framework monetary justice could develop as an unbiased and socially 
just way of deterring crime. Leveling the playing field seems to be the goal, at least 
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underhandedly, in criminal justice systems. Money is the most sought out means of attaining 
a “leveled” playing field today. To this degree, monetary justice is counter-conducive in and 
of itself since it creates a two-tiered judicial framework; a system that unreasonably punishes 
the poor while giving a ‘slap on the wrist’ to offenders with means of payment. For this 
reason, status is given to European criminal justice networks that use “day fines and fees” to 
impose LFOs in a proportionate fashion. Making LFOs proportionate to defendants’ daily 
income and other forms of financial assets could be beneficial for America’s distributive 
justice outline (Hillsman, 1990). It all boils down to the questions: What is the necessary and 
best method, for the State (federal, state, and local governments), of functionally distributing 
resources to impoverished communities suffering from high unemployment and mass 
incarceration? And, how could criminal justice systems implement budgetary reform 
measures that are less reliant on debt prisoners to generate revenue via LFOs?  
In essence, this calls for one to rethink money’s utility and its significance as a tool of 
subsistence for the public masses. The next step is to examine the historical and political 
forces that have led to the acceptance of the current global capitalist atmosphere. Though it 
may be a bit disassociated from the general thesis of this text, global capitalism relative to the 
‘prison industrial complex’ instigates the ‘race to the bottom’ for wage outlays. In plain sight, 
businesses that globally outsource to underdeveloped market economies do so for low 
wageworkers. They are not much different from businesses invested in black prison laborers 
receiving depressed wages for extended work hours. Monetary justice has a history of 
punishing the poor by indefinitely housing them in their undercaste status. It seeks to solidify 
the poor undercaste and the well-to-do classes in their social standings by projecting high 
social value on the well-to-do cohort in an effort to degrade the indigent cohort. It is no 
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coincidence giving the racial history of the United States that African Americans more so 
than not find themselves trapped in their indigency.  
Yet, there are many ‘colorblind’ politicians and Conservative voters still today that 
insist poverty and debt entrapment is a cultural phenomenon blacks cannot seem to mobilize 
out of. This text disapproves such claims by showing that the racial history in America 
permits criminal law and justice to behave in a biased manner towards African Americans. It 
also illustrates the vicious patterns of poverty and debt African Americans have been forced 
to undergo is a consequence of slavery and State sanctioned monetary justice. Much is to be 
done if there is to be racial equity and fair justice systems in the United States, but having a 
pessimistic outlook could only exacerbate the egregious realities caused by racialized 
institutions. Thinking forward, there should be more discussion about the economics of 
criminal justice institutions and the role race and poverty play within the discourse if there is 
seriousness about criminal justice reform in the United States. Even more so, there needs to 
be general acceptance of African Americans as subject citizens in this country as opposed to 
their universal recognition as the objectified low wage earner. The black work is so 
objectified that it is not uncommon, as it was common in the Great Depression, for them to 
be hired in efforts to bust strikes and wage bargaining movements— hence the famous 
aphorism ‘last hired, first fired.’ As a result, there is a vast array ways to rethink and then 
reform the current justice system in America. Race, poverty, and money are key topics for 
reimaging and reconstructing the criminal justice economics. 	
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